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ARTICLES
LAND TRANSFERS: PROCESS AND
PROCESSORS
QUINTIN JOHNSTONE*
The buying and selling of land is a complex process that normally in-
volves a series of procedures and the assistance of service specialists skilled
in implementing these procedures. This article, that in substance comprised
the Seegers lectures for 1988, considers the land transfer process by focus-
ing on the principal service specialists who operate the process and who in
large measure are responsible for how well it functions. The principal ser-
vice specialists in the land transfer field are real estate brokers, lawyers,
title companies, and lenders.'
* Visiting Professor of Law, New York Law School; Justus S. Hotchkiss Professor of
Law Emeritus, Yale Law School.
In preparing these remarks, I have benefited from discussions with a number of knowl-
edgeable persons engaged in land transfer servicing. For this help, I am most appreciative. I
am particularly grateful for the information and insights obtained from discussions with Rich-
ard Pollay of the Chicago Title Insurance Company, Leonard Donohoe of the Chicago Title
and Trust Company, and Stewart Bohan and Richard Patterson of the Connecticut Attorneys
Title Insurance Company. However, not only am I solely responsible for what appears herein
but I am certain that my most helpful informants disagree with some of my conclusions.
1. Other generally less important specialists may also become involved in land transfer
servicing, including such groups as appraisers, escrow agents, surveyors, contractors, land plan-
ners, and termite inspectors. Some of the principal service specialists may themselves act as
these ancillary servicers. In the western United States, escrow agents have become particularly
common participants in servicing real estate sale transactions. On escrows, see D. BURKE,
LAW OF TITLE INSURANCE ch. 15 (1986); Walker & Eshee, The Safeguards and Dilemmas of
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As is true of many social processes, the transfer of land interests can-
not be fully understood without an understanding of the service specialists
who make the process work. Service specialists carry out the process, are
crucial to how it is shaped, and are the focus of legal controls over the
process. Structural and operational changes in service specialists, whether
the result of market forces or government regulation, can have major conse-
quences for those the process is designed to serve - mostly buyers and
sellers of land in the case of land transfers. Changes in land transfer ser-
vicers can also have repercussions on the entire economy due to the massive
size of the American land market and its extension into every local
community.
In the four sections that follow, services provided by the principal land
transfer service groups are first described, followed by a discussion of im-
portant new developments involving these servicers. Section III presents a
consideration of deficiencies in land transfer servicing, and finally observa-
tions are made in Section IV about adaptations of land transfer servicing to
the future, including some suggestions for change. Land transfer servicers
are operating in a period of unusual volatility and changes are underway
seriously undercutting some firms in each servicing group, substantially
favoring others, and blurring somewhat the distinctions among groups as
integration efforts take place. New entrants with tremendous financial re-
sources are moving into the field aiming to take over from well-established
servicers. Foresight, willingness to innovate, and large capital resources will
be important in determining who survives and prospers and who disappears.
Also important will be legal changes in how the servicers are regulated,
whether by additional regulation or deregulation; but it is inevitable that
important legal changes will take place in the near term.
I. THE SERVICE GROUPS
A. Real Estate Brokers
The major services provided by real estate brokers are bringing buyers
and sellers together, assisting them to make informed decisions on whether
or not to enter into sales contracts, and assisting them with the terms of any
such agreements.2 Most brokered real estate sales are of single family resi-
Escrows, 16 REAL EST. L.J. 45 (1987).
2. On real estate brokers and their work, see D. BURKE, LAW OF REAL ESTATE BRO-
KERS ch. 1 (1982); P. ROHAN, B. GOLDSTEIN & C. BOBIs, REAL ESTATE BROKERAGE LAW
AND PRACTICE (1985); U.S. FED. TRADE COMM'N, THE REAL ESTATE BROKERAGE INDUSTRY
(1983); Currier, Finding the Broker's Place in the Typical Residential Real Estate Transac-
tion, 33 U. FLA. L. REV. 655 (1981). Functions of industrial real estate brokers are discussed
in SOCIETY OF INDUSTRIAL REAL ESTATE BROKERS, INDUSTRIAL REAL ESTATE chs. 6-7 (4th
ed. 1984).
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dences and one or both parties to these sales agreements usually know little
about land transfer procedures and often know little about the housing mar-
ket. Furthermore, the buyers usually have a limited capacity to evaluate the
merits of the properties being purchased. Thus, in these residential transac-
tions, brokers commonly assume important educational and advisory roles
in relation to the parties. In sales of commercial, industrial, large multi-unit
residential, and most large agricultural land parcels, the parties normally
are far more knowledgeable. While brokers in these transactions also may
have educational and advisory roles, they operate in a context of far greater
buyer and seller expertise. Although most real estate sales are made with
the assistance of brokers, a small, but possibly growing minority are made
by owners without the participation of brokers.
Many real estate brokers long have supplemented their land sales with
one or more other business activities related to land; activities that provide
added income and that draw on their land market expertise and customer
contacts. Among these supplemental business activities are sales of property
and casualty insurance as agents of insurance companies, real estate ap-
praisal, leasing and management of rental properties, and the closing of real
estate sales transactions. Brokers also commonly perform the service of re-
ferring their customers to other land transfer specialists, such as lenders
and lawyers, as needed.
Real estate brokers for their sales work almost universally are paid on
a commission basis, commonly six percent of the contract price, and esti-
mates indicate that gross commissions nationally can total as much as $10
billion per year.' The commission is earned only if a willing buyer is found,
a contract to purchase is entered into, or the sales transaction is closed and
a deed delivered. The broker's contract with his principal, usually the seller,
often expressly states how far the transaction must proceed before the bro-
ker's commission is earned. Irrespective of how much time and money the
broker invests in trying to effectuate a sale, the broker normally receives
nothing for his efforts unless a qualified buyer is produced and a sale is
made or some other specified stage in the transaction is reached. Real es-
tate brokers' commission rates are not set by statute or government regula-
tion, but by contract between brokers and their principals.
Broker-principal contracts vary as to the exclusiveness of the broker's
right to sell. What brokers prefer and often obtain from their principals is
an exclusive right-to-sell listing, one in which only the broker may attempt
to sell the property. If another broker or the seller arranges for the sale, the
3. This estimate is for the year 1979. Erxleben, In Search of Price and Service Competi-
tion in Residential Real Estate Brokerage: Breaking the Cartel, 56 WASH. L. REv. 179, 180
(1981). Obviously, this amount will vary from year to year depending on activity in the real
estate sales market and overall shifts in the dollar value of land and land improvements.
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exclusive right-to-sell broker is entitled to the contracted for commission.
Another listing format is the exclusive agency, under which the broker re-
ceives a commission if another broker sells, but not if the sale is effectuated
by the seller. Still another format is the open listing, one entitling the bro-
ker to a commission only if he makes the sale, not if it is made by another
broker or by the seller's efforts. Listing agreements often expressly set an
expiration date for the listing, and if no such date appears in the agree-
ment, a reasonable time is usually implied.
The typical real estate brokerage firm is a small, local operation serv-
ing primarily the small town or section of the metropolitan area in which its
office is located. A minority of firms in metropolitan areas expand their
effective service coverage by maintaining two or more offices, each in a dif-
ferent suburban or central city area. Almost all communities are served by
conveniently located real estate brokers' offices, and a considerable number
of competing offices exist in most areas.
In most communities, marketing of single-family residences is greatly
enhanced by a form of cooperative venture among brokers, the multiple
listing service (MLS). The MLS device, well-established in the United
States since at least the 1920s, is a pooled marketing arrangement, func-
tioning somewhat like a stock or commodities exchange, in which listings of
properties for sale made with any participating broker are circulated to all
other brokers participating in the scheme. Prospective buyers who contact
any participating broker then are informed of the types of available proper-
ties that are listed through the exchange. If a listed property is sold, the
sales commission is split between the listing broker, the one with whom the
property was originally listed, and the so-called selling broker, the one who
finds a buyer. The split often is even, half to each. Commonly, participating
MLS brokers require exclusive right-to-sell listings from their clients with
the further understanding that the exclusive right extends to sales efforts by
all other brokers participating in the MLS scheme. In many communities,
most brokers operating in an area are members of a multiple listing service
and each service usually covers a substantial local area, such as an entire
trading area or a large section of one. Some brokers belong to more than
one MLS, thereby attaining even more expansive coverage.
Real estate brokers have a powerful trade association network of local
and state boards affiliated with the National Association of Realtors
(NAR). The NAR has approximately 700,000 members, including both
brokers and sales persons. Realtors, a copyrighted term, are broker-mem-
bers of the NAR. About one-third of the NAR members are realtors; the
others, mostly salespersons, are realtor-associates.4 Many multiple listing
services are administered by local real estate boards and the trade associa-
4. D. BURKE, supra note 2, at 4.
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tion network is active in educating members, developing ethical standards
for the occupation, lobbying, and litigating regulatory issues.
Sales of industrial and commercial properties are a specialty and most
individuals doing this kind of work devote all their time to either the com-
mercial or industrial side of the business with some specializing in a partic-
ular subcategory of one of these types of properties.5 Other brokerage firms
concentrate exclusively on industrial or commercial properties, and many
larger brokerage firms have a separate commercial or industrial depart-
ment. Customers of commercial and industrial brokers include both pro-
spective users and equity investors. Many customers are also interested in
long-term leasing as a possible alternative to purchasing. The amount of
background knowledge and experience required in commercial or industrial
brokerage generally is greater than that required for the residential side of
the business. This is because commercial and industrial properties are more
varied, with more diverse use possibilities, and because transactions trans-
ferring interests in these properties are more complex and less standardized
than is typical of residential properties. Among other significant respects in
which commercial and industrial brokerage differs from residential broker-
age are that in the former the percentage of part-time sales personnel is far
smaller. Moreover, commission rates are usually lower, but commission
payments usually higher, because property values typically are higher. Fi-
nally, individual brokerage firms tend to operate over larger geographic ar-
eas because their markets tend to be spread out more; multiple listing ser-
vices are much less frequently relied on although interfirm cooperation and
resultant commission splits commonly do take place.
Compared to many occupations, real estate brokers are not extensively
regulated by government.' Real estate brokers are licensed, although license
acquisition is relatively easy to obtain; and real estate brokers are, of
course, subject to the limitations of antitrust law and to laws restricting
performance of many law-related services to lawyers. There are few other
significant regulatory restrictions on them of much significance.' Every
state licenses brokers, but the requirements vary somewhat from state to
state. Generally, an examination is required along with evidence of good
moral character. Licenses are subject to revocation for improper conduct.
Some classes of persons may engage in real estate brokerage activities with-
5. A helpful source on the practice of industrial real estate brokerage is SOCIETY OF
INDUSTRIAL REALTORS, INDUSTRIAL REAL ESTATE, supra note 2.
6. On regulation of real estate brokers, see generally D. BURKE, supra note 2, chs. 5-7.
7. Federal and state fair housing laws, although difficult to enforce, also impose major
restrictions on residential real estate brokers in many communities by prohibiting discrimina-
tion on such grounds as race, sex, and national origin in the marketing of housing. On these
laws see D. BURKE, supra note 2, ch. 6; Note, Racial Steering: The Real Estate Broker and
Title VIII, 85 YALE L.J. 808 (1976).
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out being licensed; commonly, persons selling properties they own, lawyers,
and financial institutions acting as fiduciaries. Salespersons, those persons
working for a broker as employees or independent contractors, are sepa-
rately licensed, although the examination and other prerequisites for these
licenses ordinarily are less demanding than for broker licenses. A high per-
centage of licensed salespersons work only part-time at selling real estate.
Many hold other jobs full-time and moonlight at selling real estate. Some
are housewives or retired persons without other employment. In periods
when sales activity is slow, there is a tendency for the part-timers to put in
less effort on their real estate work or to withdraw entirely pending market
revival. The usual compensation of salespersons, both full- and part-time, is
a portion of the sales commission going to the broker.
Over the years, real estate brokers have become embroiled in serious
controversies over their alleged violations of antitrust laws and the proscrip-
tions on unauthorized practice of law. In each of these regulatory spheres,
there has been considerable litigation involving real estate brokers, and ju-
dicial opinions have resolved some of the troublesome questions as to what
is permissible and what is not. Most of the antitrust cases have focused on
uniformity of commission rates or limiting access to multiple listing ser-
vices. Agreements to fix commission rates are illegal under the antitrust
laws whether express or implied from conduct of the parties, but the fact
that brokers in a community charge uniform rates is not by itself sufficient
to show illegal collusion. Additional evidence of collusion is necessary, and
without evidence of an express agreement, this collusion can be difficult to
prove no matter how suspicious one may be that collusion is contributing to
the uniformity. A recent report asserts that the uniformity may be noncol-
lusive and may result from a holdover of rates prevalent prior to 1950 when
express rate-fixing arrangements were common and thought legal. The re-
port also asserts that the uniformity may result from the belief of brokers
that rate cutting would be pointless as rival firms would promptly respond
by cutting their rates in order to maintain market share.8 These arguments
are unconvincing, but fully adequate explanations for the uniformity are not
apparent. In addition, the multiple listing service has allegedly been used as
a contributing device for illegal price fixing by such means as refusing MLS
access to brokers who might cut prices, threatening MLS expulsion of bro-
kers who depart from fixed prices, boycotting by selling brokers of cut-rate
8. Phillips & Butler, The Law and Economics of Residential Real Estate Markets in
Texas: Regulation and Antitrust Implications, 36 BAYLOR L. REV. 623, 640-41 (1984). The
general belief that real estate brokers were not covered by the Sherman Act was dispelled in
1950 by United States v. National Ass'n of Real Estate Boards, 339 U.S. 485 (1950), which
stated that brokerage was not considered a trade within the meaning of the Act. Since a 1980
decision of the Court, however, it has been clear that most real estate broker transactions are
sufficiently involved in interstate commerce to be subject to the Sherman Act. McLain v. Real
Estate Bd. of New Orleans, 444 U.S. 232 (1980).
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listing brokers, and exchanging price information with the objective of
freezing prices generally. Courts have held blatant instances of this sort to
be in violation of the antitrust laws, mostly state laws, but distinguishing
legitimate from illegitimate conduct can be difficult.9 This results in consid-
erable inconsistency in the caselaw, particularly as to what conditions may
validly be imposed on broker access to multiple listing services. 0
On unauthorized practice of law issues, the brokers have been some-
what more successful against their opponents, usually bar associations."
Conflict has centered on which land transfer documents, if any, brokers
may draft. This is a matter of state law and courts have quite universally
held that brokers may fill in standard form sales contracts for the parties
because this type of activity is incidental to the brokers' primary function of
bringing buyers and sellers together. There is less consensus among the
states as to the right of brokers to draft post-contract-of-sale documents,
such as deeds, purchase money mortgages, and instruments curing title de-
fects. Some states permit brokers to prepare these documents, others do
not.' 2 Even though they usually make no separate charge for instrument
preparation, brokers commonly desire to do this type of work because their
customers look favorably on what is seen as a free accommodation service.
The practice saves time and parties are often in a hurry, and broker instru-
ment preparation eliminates the risk that if lawyers become involved they
may upset the deal by finding fault with the business merits of the transac-
tion. However, even if they are legally authorized to do so, brokers are
chary of preparing complicated conveyancing instruments, especially those
requiring considerable original phrasing by the drafter, due to risks of lia-
bility for drafting defective or ill-suited documents.
The response of real estate brokers to criticisms of how they operate
has been defensive, aggressively so on issues threatening their profitability.
9. On MLS practices and the antitrust laws see D. BURKE, supra note 2, at 340-52;
Chang, Multiple Listing Services: The Antitrust Issues, 10 REAL EST. L.J. 228 (1982);
Erxleben, supra note 3, at 189-211.
10. The access cases are considered in Miller & Shedd, Do Antitrust Laws Apply to the
Real Estate Brokerage Industry?, 17 AM. Bus. L.J. 313, 315-18 (1979); Malin, Real Estate
Multiple Listing Services and the Sherman Act: A Response to Miller and Shedd, 18 AM.
Bus. L.J. 77 (1980); Trombetta, A Response to Malin's Response to Miller and Shedd's Real
Estate Multiple Listing Services and the Sherman Act, 19 AM. Bus. L.J. 370 (1981).
11. On unauthorized practice of law by real estate brokers, see D. BURKE, supra note 2,
ch. 8; Shedd, Real Estate Agents and the Unauthorized Practice of Law, 10 REAL EST. L.J.
135 (1981). Two recent cases on the subject are Cultum v. Heritage House Realtors, Inc., 103
Wash. 2d 623, 694 P.2d 630 (1985) (licensed real estate brokers and salespersons may com-
plete form earnest money agreements), and New Jersey State Bar Ass'n v. New Jersey Ass'n
of Realtor Bds., 93 N.J. 470, 461 A.2d 1112 (1983) (consent judgment approved permitting
real estate brokers and salespersons to prepare contracts for the sale of one- to four-unit resi-
dential real estate).
12. Shedd, supra note 11, at 139-41.
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This is characteristic of trade groups when under attack. Charges of illegal
conduct have generally been denied and antitrust and unauthorized practice
cases often vigorously defended, with broker trade associations commonly
taking over responsibility for representing broker interests.
B. Lawyers
Historically, land transfer servicing was one of the principal types of
work performed by American lawyers, and although of less overall signifi-
cance to contemporary lawyers than to their predecessors, it is still of tre-
mendous importance to many in practice today. This phase of the practice
also is referred to as conveyancing, settlement, or closing work. Small pri-
vate law firms and solo practitioners in the general practice of law are par-
ticularly active in sales of single-family residences and family farms, with
larger law firms concentrating on sales of more expensive properties, such
as large apartment buildings, hotels, office buildings, and industrial proper-
ties. Legal work required in connection with the ordinary single-family
home sale tends to be a routine procedure including preparation of the con-
tract of sale; title search, title examination, and perhaps clearing of title
defects; drafting or review of a mortgage; drafting of a deed; preparation of
a closing statement showing expenses and receipts; and a final closing ses-
sion in which the seller is paid and the deed delivered to the buyer. Supple-
mental steps often are involved, such as ordering a survey and reviewing the
surveyor's report, and ordering and approving a title insurance policy. The
period between the contract of sale and closing usually is eight or ten
weeks, during which time the buyer ordinarily arranges for financing and
the necessary title work is performed. Added problems, of course, may
emerge in connection with the sale transaction which lawyers may be asked
to resolve, such as controversies over the broker's commission or deed cove-
nant compliance. In sales of properties for large sums of money, a much
wider range of legal problems typically exists, including intricate financing
arrangements, complicated income tax considerations, zoning and other
land use control issues, and frequently construction problems, as these sales
often are tied into major development projects.
In the sale of a single-family residence, the buyer and seller each may
be represented by a different lawyer; or to save expense, the same lawyer
may represent both, only one may be represented by a lawyer, or neither
may be represented. Also, in single family residence sales, there are consid-
erable variations in lawyers' roles depending on the geographic area."3 In
13. Closing customs, including the allocation of functions among such service specialists
as buyer's lawyer, seller's lawyer, and the real estate broker, vary not only among states but
within states. For example, closing customs in Connecticut vary considerably among counties,
and in some instances among towns within counties as well. A detailed description of these
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many places, lawyers do not become involved in such sale transactions until
after the contract of sale has been signed because brokers commonly pre-
pare the sales contracts. In some areas, lawyers in private practice do little
or no title work unless title curing litigation is necessary; title insurers, rely-
ing on their private title plants and their own staff, perform the requisite
search and examination tasks. In still other areas, lay abstracters do most
of the title searching, and lawyers' title work is restricted largely to legal
evaluation of titles based on summaries of public title records prepared by
the abstracters. Similarly, lawyers do not have a monopoly on final closings
in many regions. In many communities, title companies, lenders, brokers, or
escrow companies have taken over much of the final closing or settlement
work. Lawyers in larger firms often refuse to do single-family residence
closings or will do them only as an accommodation for their better clients.
Overhead of these firms is such that they claim closing work of this kind is
unprofitable. Title companies, too, frequently assert that closings are un-
profitable. However, for title companies, as well as for real estate brokers,
performing this service, even at a loss, can presumably pay off in competi-
tive advantage.
Mortgage lenders are usually represented by lawyers who make certain
that in individual transactions the lenders' interests are adequately pro-
tected. Some home buyers do not retain their own counsel because they are
willing to gamble that transaction approval by the lenders' lawyers suffi-
ciently protects the buyers' generally similar, but in some respects quite
different, interests.
Whatever the type of land parcel being sold - big or small, residential
or nonresidential - the buyer's lawyer may perform the added service of
referring the buyer to other needed service specialists with referrals to a
title insurer being particularly common. Lawyers involved at the early
stages in sale transactions, at the contract of sale stage, for example, are
more likely to provide referral services. Referrals may be part of the role
lawyers do not infrequently perform in coordinating the entire sale transac-
tion, especially for less knowledgeable clients. However, even in big deals
involving well-informed clients, a lawyer may serve as transaction
coordinator.
Compared to most occupations, lawyers are extensively regulated with
the focus heavily on the individual lawyer. Licensing requirements are de-
manding in their education and bar examination prerequisites, and profes-
sional behavior after licensing is subject to comprehensive controls, princi-
pally by the courts. The most detailed postadmission regulations are two
sets of ethical standards of conduct, the Model Code of Professional Re-
variations appears in CONNECTICUT ATTORNEYS TITLE INSURANCE COMPANY, A GUIDE TO
CLOSING CUSTOMS IN CONNECTICUT (1986).
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sponsibility and the more recent Model Rules of Professional Conduct.
These standards were drafted and approved by the American Bar Associa-
tion, and, with the exception of California, one or the other set is in effect
in every state." Violations can subject lawyers to disciplinary sanctions, im-
posed generally by the courts, varying from judicial censure to disbarment.
Relative to land transfer servicing, there are several respects in which the
standards are of particular importance: in particular, they severely restrict
the conflict of interest situations in which an individual lawyer or law firm
may become involved, 5 and they permit lawyer advertising but prohibit in-
person solicitation of prospective clients." The conflict of interest proscrip-
tions do not prevent a lawyer from representing both the buyer and seller or
borrower and lender in the same real estate sale transaction, provided that
neither party is likely to be harmed thereby and both parties consent. How-
ever, some lawyers consider the possibilities of conflict so serious that they
will never represent both parties to a real estate transaction; and there is
case law which indicates that when such dual representation occurs the con-
sents must be knowing and based on full and timely disclosure. 7 Lawyers
may, and a considerable number do, advertise that they will perform land
transfer services, but questions have arisen about the validity of direct mail
advertising of such services."s The prohibition of in-person solicitation of
potential clients outlaws such possible means of generating land transfer
legal work as lawyers or their agents making solicitation calls in person or
by telephone on persons who are actively seeking to buy a home or who
have contracted to do so.
For many years, lawyers and their professional associations were gen-
erally believed to be exempt from the federal antitrust laws, but in a 1975
14. California has its own set of rules that in many respects resembles the ABA Model
Code or Model Rules. In most states, the ABA Model Code or Model Rules have been
adopted as rules of court; and in some states, the ABA version has been somewhat modified.
Approximately half the states have now adopted the Model Rules, and within a few years
quite probably at least two-thirds will have done so.
15. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rules 1.7-1.9 (1980) [hereinafter
MODEL RULES]; MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR5-101 to -106 (1980)
[hereinafter MODEL CODE].
16. MODEL RULES, supra note 15, Rules 7.1-7.5; MODEL CODE, supra note 15,
DR2-101 to -106.
17. Two cases in which lawyers were sanctioned for inadequate client disclosure when
simultaneously representing buyers and sellers in real estate transactions are In re Dolan, 76
N.J. 1, 384 A.2d 1076 (1978), and In re Robertson, 290 Or. 639, 624 P.2d 603 (1981).
18. Lawyers seeking closing work by mass mailings to property owners held permissible
in Koffler v. Joint Bar Ass'n, 51 N.Y.2d 140, 412 N.E.2d 927, 432 N.Y.S.2d 872 (1980), cert.
denied, 450 U.S. 1026 (1981). But see State v. Moses, 231 Kan. 243, 642 P.2d 1004 (1982).
However, mass mailings by a law firm to real estate brokers in effect seeking referrals of
closings have been held improper because conflict of interest between the referring broker and
any referred client could adversely affect law firm representation of the client. In re Alessi, 60
N.Y.2d 229, 457 N.E.2d 682, 469 N.Y.S.2d 577 (1983), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1102 (1984).
[Vol. 22
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opinion, Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar,' the United States Supreme Court
corrected this view. In the Goldfarb case, the Court held that bar associa-
tion minimum fee schedules and their implementation violated the Sherman
Act. The complained-of fee fixing in the Goldfarb case pertained to real
property title examinations, but the Goldfarb opinion obviously applies to
most services the prices of which are set by bar association minimum fee
schedules. Such schedules, at the time of the Supreme Court ruling, were in
effect in much of the United States and set extensively adhered-to prices for
many services performed by lawyers for their clients. Goldfarb ended the
bar association practice of adopting or enforcing fee schedules and the opin-
ion indicates that the federal antitrust laws would be applicable as well to
other anticompetitive practices of the organized bar. However, sufficiently
direct state government intervention, as by statute or rule of court mandat-
ing particular professional behavior, would clearly result in immunity from
federal antitrust restraints under the Parker v. Brown0 state action exemp-
tion. The states have not backed bar association-sponsored minimum fee
schedules with the requisite exempting state action, but wide-spread state
court adoption of the ABA-sponsored Model Code and Model Rules as
rules of court presumably is reflective of willingness by states to try and
immunize these standards from the federal antitrust laws.
Another important federal enactment of importance regulating certain
aspects of the land transfer servicing work of lawyers is the Real Estate
Settlement Procedures Act (RESPA). 2 ' The act followed a comprehensive
congressionally authorized study of settlement costs carried out over several
years by the Department of Housing and Urban Development and the Vet-
erans Administration. As amended, RESPA is considerably less inclusive
than its proponents favored, particularly as to disclosures to borrowers,2 2
but it has had an appreciable impact on the land transfer process, including
its restrictions on fees for referrals, a subject of particular relevance to law-
yers. RESPA applies to settlement services pertaining to mortgage loans
and covers the vast majority of mortgage loans made in the United States.
Settlement services include most types of work performed by lawyers in
relation to loans covered by the Act. Some examples are title search and
examination, document preparation, and final closing.23 Lawyers, of course,
can be compensated for this work, but only for services actually performed.
Referrals are not compensable services under the Act. Thus, RESPA out-
laws fees, commissions, kickbacks, rebates, or fee splits to lawyers for refer-
ring settlement work to others, including the referring of work to title com-
19. 421 U.S. 773 (1975).
20. 317 U.S. 341 (1943).
21. 12 U.S.C. §§ 2601-2617 (1982).
22. See infra note 88.
23. The term settlement services as used in the Act is defined in RESPA, 12 U.S.C. §
2602(3) (1982).
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panies and real estate brokers. 4 The prohibition of referral fees has proven
especially troublesome in relations between lawyers and title insurers. Law-
yers are strategically placed to determine which title insurers are asked to
issue policies if the lawyers are doing the title or other legal work in con-
nection with land sale and mortgage transactions. Clients needing title in-
surance commonly rely on their lawyers for recommendations as to which
insurer to use and follow these recommendations. In addition to work for
buyers or lenders, lawyers may perform services for title insurers in the
same transactions, such as certifying the titles for insurance purposes, col-
lecting and forwarding policy premiums, and even issuing policies as agents
of the insurers in many instances. This dual representation by a lawyer of a
buyer or lender and a title insurer generally is permissible without violating
conflict of interest proscriptions if full disclosure is made to the clients. 5
Although dual representation can be permissible, collecting a fee from in-
surers for referring work to them is not allowed, and charging both clients
for the identical service may constitute an excessive and improper fee. 6
To circumvent the prohibition on referral fees, some title insurers are
presumably paying excessive amounts to lawyers for legitimate services so
as to conceal what in effect are illegal referral fees.27 For example, fees paid
by insurers to lawyers ostensibly for policy issuance and necessary back-
ground title work are commonly forty percent of the premiums according to
one source 28 and typically range from sixty to ninety percent according to
another.2 9 Not only may these payments violate RESPA, but they may also
24. The section of RESPA prohibiting referral fees and fee-splitting is 12 U.S.C. § 2607
(1982).
25. ABA Comm. on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Formal Op. 331 (1972).
26. N.Y. State Bar Ass'n Committee on Professional Ethics, Opinion 576 (1985).
27. A recent Federal Trade Commission opinion describes this situation as follows:
The relationship between agents (especially attorney-agents) and title insurers is
fraught with opportunities for directing the placement of title insurance business. While
ostensibly acting as independent legal counsel to a usually uninformed buyer, the attor-
ney-agent is in a position to channel the consumer's title insurance business to the agent's
insurer-principal in exchange for commissions, commonly referred to in the title insur-
ance business as "agent's retention" since the agent collects and transmits the premium
less his "retention" to the insurer. The agent's retention, however, includes not only the
actual cost of conducting the search and examination, but may also reflect his ability to
negotiate for a large part of the total insurance premium (as much as 90 percent) on the
basis of his strategic position in the real estate transaction. In point of fact, the growth of
a title insurer is largely tied to its ability to solicit and retain attorney-agents who can
influence the placement of business.
In re Ticor Title Ins. Co., F.T.C. No. 9190, V 44 (Dec. 22, 1986).
On alleged violations of RESPA in referral of mortgage loans to lenders by real estate
brokers, lawyers, and others, see Levy, RESPA: Referral Fees Yes or No?, MORTGAGE BANK-
ING, Feb. 1988, at 85.
28. Marcotte, Kickbacks to Lawyers Rapped, 72 A.B.A. J. 30 (1986).
29. Blyth, Guidelines for the Practice of Splitting Title Insurance Premiums Between
Title Insurance Companies and Attorneys in the State of New York, N.Y. ST. B.J., Jan. 1987,
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violate laws of some states against title insurance premium splits and re-
bates."0 RESPA and the state prohibitions on referral fees are attempting
to achieve reduction of title insurance costs to insureds while strengthening
the financial condition of the insurers by eliminating intermediary fees
based on control over work flow. Proving violations, however, can be diffi-
cult because of the uncertainty as to what constitutes reasonable charges
for the legitimate services being provided and billed by lawyers, and there-
fore whether or not referral fees are being concealed in billings of legiti-
mate services. The problem is not restricted to lawyer intermediaries, as the
prohibitions on referral fees for channeling settlement service work also ap-
ply to real estate brokers and lenders.
With respect to unauthorized practice in providing land transfer ser-
vices, lawyers are in a fairly favorable position, although subject to some
significant restrictions. In every state, unauthorized practice of law pro-
scriptions provide lawyers with a measure of protection against lay competi-
tion,31 although this protection is substantially qualified with respect to
competition from real estate brokers32 and title insurance companies.3 " Fur-
thermore, in some states, lawyers are permitted to perform one of the most
important nonlegal land transfer services - brokerage, merely by being
licensed to practice law. However, in other states, lawyers are exempt from
real estate broker licensing requirements only when acting within the scope
of their duties as lawyers.3 4 There are also deterrents to integration of legal
and brokerage aspects of land transfer servicing. These include restrictions
on lawyers using another business as a front for attracting legal work,3" and
prohibitions against lawyers aiding in the unauthorized practice of law,"6
against sharing legal fees with nonlawyers, and against carrying on a law
practice with lay co-owners. s1
at 46, 47-48. This article also discusses compensation arrangements between lawyers and title
companies when the attorney's role is that of attorney closer, approved attorney, or examining
counsel. In Texas, the usual insurance premium that agents legally may keep is 80%. Phillips
& Butler, supra note 8, at 656.
30. Blyth, supra note 29, at 48; Marcotte, supra note 28.
31. On unauthorized practice of law, see C. WOLFRAM, MODERN LEGAL ETHICS 824-49
(1986); Payne, Title Insurance and the Unauthorized Practice of Law Controversy, 53 MINN.
L. REV. 423 (1969).
32. See supra notes 11-12 and accompanying text.
33. See infra notes 61-62 and accompanying text.
34. See generally Annotation, Right of Attorney as Such, to Act or Become Licensed to
Act as Real Estate Broker, 4 A.L.R. 4th 230 (1983).
35. These and other restrictions, particularly when lawyers conduct another occupation
from their law offices, are discussed in ABA Comm. on Ethics and Professional Responsibility,
Formal Op. 328 (1972), and Informal Op. 1482 (1982).
36. MODEL RULES, supra note 15, Rule 5.5(b); MODEL CODE, supra note 15, DR3-
101(A).
37, MODEL RULES, supra note 15, Rule 5.4; MODEL CODE, supra note 15, DR3-102(A),
3-103(A), 5-107(B), 5-107(C).
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C. Title Insurers
The principal service provided by title insurers is making title insur-
ance coverage available to land owners and lenders.3 8 Incidental to this ser-
vice, insurers provide interested parties, in advance of coverage, with impor-
tant information about title quality, including outstanding title defects of
which the insurer is aware. Insurers may also provide information about the
insurability of title and the terms for insuring title. Most title insurance is
applied for during the process of selling land, and title quality information
can be crucial in determining whether or not loans will be made and sales
will take place. Loan commitments and sales contracts are normally condi-
tioned on title to the property involved being marketable, insurable with
only specified exceptions, or meeting some other quality standard. Further-
more, owners and contract buyers may want precise title quality informa-
tion for reasons other than insurance, reasons such as estimating how much
it will cost to clear any title defects or determining if the title is adequate to
merit major physical improvements on the premises. Thus, providing infor-
mation, in addition to providing insurance, is a major title insurer service.
Further services that many title insurers have long performed are supervis-
ing closings and acting as escrow agents in real estate transactions. A few
title insurers also act as trust companies and administer a considerable
number of trust accounts.
Determining with accuracy the outstanding legal interests in any par-
ticular parcel of land, especially in the United States, usually is an onerous,
expensive, and time-consuming process. There is also the possibility that
even with a careful search some interests will not be discovered, either be-
cause they are undiscoverable by the searcher or because they cannot be
found without a prohibitively expensive search. This inability-to-discover
risk ordinarily is remote, yet troublesome, particularly to buyers and lend-
ers. Negligence in the search and examination process also is a serious risk
which title policies can protect against. Title insurance thus has made a
cumbersome and somewhat chancy system of title protection, more viable
by compensating insureds when and if insured-against losses are incurred.
Title insurance also has provided, through standardized policy coverage, a
substantial degree of national uniformity in title protection, a feature highly
desirable to the increasingly significant national market in mortgages. Each
land parcel has unique characteristics, the terms in mortgage often differ,
and title and mortgage laws vary considerably among the states, but title
insurance superimposes an element of fungibility to mortgages that is
38. On title insurance generally, see A.B.A. SECTION OF REAL PROPERTY, PROBATE AND
TRUST LAW, TITLE INSURANCE: THE LAWYER'S EXPANDING ROLE (1985) [hereinafter THE
LAWYER'S EXPANDING ROLE]; A. AXELROD, C. BERGER & Q. JOHNSTONE, LAND TRANSFER
AND FINANCE, CASES AND MATERIALS 764-851 (3d ed. 1986); D. BURKE, supra note 1.
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highly attractive to lenders. This helps explain why a major reason for the
spread of title insurance in the United States has been the demand for this
type of protection by mortgage lenders, particularly national mortgage
lenders.
The recording acts are the foundation of American land title protection
and, in one form or another, have long been in effect in each American
state. These acts require that massive sets of land records be maintained at
the county or equivalent level by local government officials throughout the
United States. These records pertain to local land transactions going back
to early settlement in the area. The rationale of the acts is simple: failure of
a land interest holder to record in these public records evidence of his inter-
est can result in subsequent takers of the same parcel acquiring their inter-
ests free of the prior interest holder's claims. The subsequent taker, to pre-
vail against prior interest holders, normally must be a purchaser or lender,
and when taking must have no actual or constructive notice of the predeces-
sor's claimed interest. Subsequent takers are on constructive notice of prior
recorded interests against the property, relevant claims disclosed by court or
tax records, and information that a physical examination of the premises
would disclose as to title claims. Any of the many kinds of legally recog-
nized land interests such as fees, leases, mortgages, easements, profits, and
liens, are affected by the recording acts. Public officials in whose offices
public land records customarily are kept include county recorders of deeds,
court clerks, and county tax collectors. These offices are open to the public
for, among other purposes, land title searches. Obviously, the recording acts
make it highly desirable for persons acquiring, for consideration, valuable
interests in land to have a careful title search made before final acquisition,
with the search data evaluated by a competent examiner. This provides sub-
stantial protection against acquiring a lesser title than anticipated or con-
tracted for. Lenders ordinarily insist on title searches and examinations
prior to making mortgage loans and usually such persons as fee buyers,
long-term lessees, and those acquiring valuable mineral rights first have ti-
tle searches and examinations made for them.
Public land title records in many counties, particularly in counties with
large populations and many land parcels, are ill-suited to efficient title
searches. Relevant records may be scattered in different locations, indexes
needed to locate essential documents may be ineffectually organized, docu-
ment retrieval can be a laborious manual process, and the tremendous vol-
ume of records adds to the search burden. To streamline searches, private
so-called title plants have been set up in a minority of counties. These
plants duplicate, centralize, and organize data from local public land title
records in a manner far more conducive to rapid and accurate searches
than when searches are made in the original public records. Title plants are
kept up to date by the expensive procedure of making daily take-offs of all
new additions to the public records and incorporating these additions into
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the private plants. Each plant typically includes records on every land par-
cel in the county, and some plants cover all transactions back to the origin
of recognized titles in the county. Some plants are extensively automated."9
Most large title plants are owned and operated by title insurers and are
used for making searches on parcels for which title insurance orders have
been received. Some plants are now shared by more than one title insurer,
either as joint ventures or by the owner selling access to other insurers.
Most title insurers operate in part through agents that take orders for
title insurance. The agents may be authorized to search and evaluate title
data and issue commitments to insure. Lawyers and abstracters often act as
agents of title insurers and some agents represent more than one insurer. In
addition to their agents, most title insurers have branch offices that issue
policies in the areas they are responsible for and provide the preliminary
work required in determining insurability. Some branches and some agents
operate their own title plants. Each of the large national title insurers has
much of the nation blanketed with a network of branches and agents, and
the trend is toward greater reliance on agents.'
To the extent that title insurers or their agents do not make title
searches and examinations, title insurance policies are issued in reliance on
opinions of nonagent lawyers as to title quality of the parcels in question.
The underlying title searches for these opinions are in some places customa-
rily made in the public records by the lawyers who provide title opinions. In
other places, the searches customarily are made by abstracters who prepare
written reports of their searches, and lawyers' title opinions are then based
on data in the abstracts. Each abstract summarizes every public record en-
try that has been located pertaining to the parcel being searched. The ab-
stract usually includes entries dating back to origin of the title, and the
summaries are sufficiently detailed so that the examining lawyer can give
an adequate opinion on present ownership and outstanding encumbrances.
In some parts of the country, buyers and lenders, in acquiring their inter-
ests, still commonly rely solely on lawyers' opinions and do not obtain the
added protection of title insurance."1 However, title insurance has become
39. On title plant automation, see Dunin, The Automated Title Plant, TITLE NEWS,
Jan. 1984, at 12; Morgan, Workshop: Automation in the Local Title Office, TITLE NEWS, Jan.
1984, at 7; Toft, Outlook for Title Industry Automation, TITLE NEWS, Jan.-Feb. 1986, at 16.
40. See Currier, The Future of the Title Insurance Agent, TITLE NEWS, June-July
1983, at 10. On lawyers as agents of title insurers, see Travaskis, The Role of the Lawyer as
an Agent or Approved Attorney, in THE LAWYER'S EXPANDING ROLE, supra note 38, at 299.
41. The practice of relying on lawyers' title opinions without title insurance is still fairly
frequent in Midwestern and Southeastern small towns and in New England, but title insurance
based on a lawyer's opinion has become much more common even in these areas. In many
smaller Midwestern counties, lawyers' opinions are based on abstracts prepared by local ab-
stract companies. Title insurers do most of the title search and examination work, relying
usually on their own title plants, in the Far West and in many larger urban areas elsewhere in
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so widely accepted that the number of areas in which it is customary to rely
only on lawyers' opinions are far fewer than thirty or forty years ago. The
spread of title insurance is now so extensive that further expansion possibili-
ties through movement into areas with little or no title insurance coverage
are fairly modest.
Compared to most forms of insurance, title coverage premiums are
low." Whether title insurance premiums are low in relation to the actual
risks underwritten, however, is a separate question. An important reason for
comparatively low title insurance premiums is the scope and character of
coverage. A title policy covers the state of the title as of the time the policy
is taken out and does not protect against subsequently-created defects. Also,
title policies are issued only after a search is made for title defects, and
known material defects are then excepted from coverage. In addition, some
types of risks are usually excluded or excepted as standard provisions, in-
cluding risks arising from building or zoning ordinances; government emi-
nent domain or police power rights unless apparent in the public records;
and mechanics liens which are not of public record. For an added premium,
some standard exclusions or exceptions will be covered. In effect, the princi-
pal risks insured against are negligence in search, examination, and private
plant maintenance; and off-record risks or those that might be located only
by an unduly onerous and costly search of the public records. As a result, in
comparison to most types of insurance, title insurance losses are low.4
Apart from exclusions and exceptions, the existence of marketable title
is usually covered in title insurance policies. Important differences, however,
exist between lenders' policies and owners' policies, including the greater
number of standard exceptions in most owners' policies and the right usu-
ally granted lenders to assign their policies to mortgage assignees. The ef-
fect of this latter difference between policies is that if owners sell their
properties, the buyers must take out new policies if they want coverage; but
if mortgagees sell their mortgages, as is common, the transferees normally
the United States. An appreciable percentage of land parcels are registered under the Torrens
system of registration in a few small counties plus a few major urban areas: Boston, Chicago
(Cook County), Honolulu, and Minneapolis-St. Paul. In Chicago, however, it is not uncommon
for Torrens titles to be insured by commercial title insurers in addition to the insurance pro-
vided by the Torrens system.
42. "Title insurance premiums," as used here, refers only to charges for risk coverage,
not charges for other services such as title search and examination that may be billed by some
companies under the heading of "premiums."
43. Only about five to ten percent of a title insurer's gross premium income is used to
pay actual losses while over 90 percent is absorbed by operating expenses, mainly the cost
of searching and examining title. In contrast, the average loss ratio for homeowner's mul-
tiple peril insurance is approximately 65 percent, and the ratio for other lines of casualty
insurance is still higher.
In re Ticor Title Ins. Co., F.T.C. No. 9190, 99 (Dec. 22, 1986).
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are covered by the original policies. Under both types of policies, however,
the insurer agrees to defend the insured in litigation that may arise involv-
ing allegations that the title as insured is defective.
Title insurance is a one premium type of insurance, the premium paid
when the policy becomes effective and usually paid by the buyer."" Rate
schedules vary considerably in different regions, but rates for risk coverage
may be as low as $2.50 per thousand dollars of coverage for a mortgagee's
policy and $3.50 per thousand dollars of coverage for an owner's policy.
Rates per thousand usually decline for upper limits of more valuable land
parcels, and rates also may be lower if an owner's policy is issued simulta-
neously with a mortgagee's policy or if the insurer has recently issued a
policy on the same property. Charges are substantially higher if the insurer
does the title searching and examining.'9 When this occurs, some companies
quote a combined rate for risk coverage and title search and examination
work, while others quote a separate rate for each component. If policies are
written through agents, lawyers or nonlawyers, the agents are paid a sub-
stantial portion of the premium payments as commissions. These commis-
sions often include background title work.' When a policy is written for a
very large amount, for instance, in excess of twenty-five million dollars, part
of the coverage is normally reinsured or coinsured with other companies in
order to spread the risk.' 7
Title insurance has been labeled as an oligopoly because of the domi-
nance by a small number of large companies 8 that operate nationwide or in
large regions. There has been a long-term trend toward increased market
concentration, mostly through larger companies buying up smaller ones. As
of recent date, the four largest insurers had slightly over half the market
and the eight largest had slightly over three-fourths of the market.' Never-
44. The buyer usually pays for both the owner's policy and mortgagee's policy if both
are issued. In some areas, however, it is customary for the seller to pay for them.
45. For example, Chicago Title Insurance Company, in the greater Chicago area, for
insurance coverage, search, and examination, charges for an owner's policy $422.50 for $50
thousand of coverage, $597.50 for $100 thousand of coverage, $2.50 per thousand for over
$100 thousand to $500 thousand, and $2.25 per thousand for over $500 thousand to $1 mil-
lion. The charge for a simultaneously issued mortgagee's policy is $90. Owner's policies are
issued for only the full value of the property. Chicago Title Insurance Company, rate schedule
effective February 1, 1986.
46. See supra note 27 and accompanying text.
47. On title policy reinsurance and coinsurance, see Bowling, Reinsurance Coverage
Panel Presentation, TITLE NEWS, Jan.-Feb. 1986, at 27. Individual policies occasionally are
written for very large amounts of money. One recently was written for $1.35 billion. Id. at 30.
48. Owen, Kickbacks, Specialization, Price Fixing, and Efficiency in Residential Real
Estate Markets, 29 STAN. L. REV. 931, 939 (1977); Uri, Injecting Competition Into the Title
Insurance Industry, REAL EST. REV., Fall, 1985, at 91, 94.
49. Uri, supra note 48, at 93-94. In 1987, market concentration was increased by Chi-
cago Title, which was until then the nation's second largest title insurer, purchasing Safeco
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theless, there is in most places a considerable measure of competition
among title insurers. Certainly, in some large cities, such as Chicago, Los
Angeles, Minneapolis, and Kansas City, where one company had a near-
monopoly years ago, a number of companies are now aggressively
competing.
One group of title insurers that nationally have only a small fraction of
the title insurance market,5" and yet as competitors have been feared and
bitterly opposed by other title insurers, is the bar-related title insurance
companies which are also known as lawyers' title guaranty funds. There are
nine of these companies and most of them write policies in only one state.51
These companies are a response of the bar to the other insurers, usually
referred to as commercial companies, that have been influential in taking
away title search and examination work from lawyers in many places. The
commercial companies have also developed a profit potential that lawyers
consider worth competing for with their own collective organizations. Each
bar-related company provides similar title insurance coverage to that writ-
ten by commercial insurers, but only to clients of practicing lawyers who
are members of the bar-related insurer. To become a member, a lawyer
generally must show experience and competence in real estate matters and
may be required to become a stockholder in the company. The member
lawyers ordinarily do the title examinations and often the searches in trans-
actions that the bar-related company is underwriting, but only the Florida
and Indiana funds have any title plants. Most bar-related companies pay
commissions to members insuring through them, and some companies pay
dividends to their stockholders. The cost to insureds of coverage through a
bar-related company is, in some places, lower than equivalent protection
provided through a commercial company. Some bar-related companies,
partly as marketing devices, provide a variety of helpful services to lawyers
Title, another very large insurer. Chicago Title now has over 5,000 policy-issuing agents na-
tionwide and over 100 full-service branch offices. TITLE NEWS, Mar.-Apr. 1987, at 24-25.
50. In some individual states, however, there are bar-related companies that are writing
a very sizable percentage of all title insurance written in the state. For example, the Connecti-
cut Attorneys Title Insurance Company in 1987 had one-fourth of the market in terms of
premiums written for title insurance in Connecticut, more than any of its eleven commercial
title underwriting competitors.
51. For a listing of companies and their activities, see NAT'L ASS'N OF BAR-RELATED
TITLE INSURERS, BAR-RELATED TITLE INSURANCE (1986). On bar-related title insurers see
also Jackson, The Saga of the Bar Funds, TITLE NEws, Jan. 1981, at 18; Miles, Bar-Related
Title Insurers: Their Benefits to the Bar and the Public, in A.B.A. SECTION OF REAL PROP-
ERTY, PROBATE AND TRUST LAW, TITLE INSURANCE AND You: WHAT EVERY LAWYER
SHOULD KNOW! 45 (1979); Payne, Title Guaranty Funds: Symptom. Cure or Nostrum?, 46
IND. L.J. 208 (1971); Rooney, Bar-Related Title Insurance: The Positive Perspective, 1980 S.
ILL. U.L.J. 263; Roussel, Pera & Rosenberg, Bar-Related Title Insurance Companies: An
Antitrust Analysis, 24 VILL. L. REV. 639 (1979).
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doing title work. 52
The national trade association of title insurers is the American Land
Title Association (ALTA), of which abstracters and agents of title insurers
are also members. ALTA performs the typical trade association functions
of lobbying, educating members, shaping views on problems facing the oc-
cupation, and strengthening a sense of occupational identity.53 An associa-
tion forms committee has been tremendously important in preparing and
periodically revising standard title insurance policy and policy endorsement
forms widely used in the United States. Affiliated with ALTA are state and
regional land title associations. Bar-related companies have recently been
accepted as ALTA members, but also have their own trade organization,
the National Association of Bar-Related Title Insurers.
Title insurers are subject to government regulation, largely at the state
level, but this control generally is less restrictive than that pertaining to
most other kinds of insurers.5 One set of insurer regulations is designed to
protect policy holders by safeguarding company solvency and the ability to
pay insured losses that may occur. Nearly all states have one or more stat-
utes directed at protecting the solvency of title insurers by such means as
reserve or guaranty funds for paying policy claims, minimum paid-in capi-
tal requirements, and reinsurance or coinsurance requirements for coverage
of single large risks. Even without these statutory forms of protection, one
powerful title insurance customer group, the large lenders, would probably
force a considerable degree of insurer solvency protection for policy holders.
Another form of government control of title insurers is rate regulation, and
about half the states impose some kind of control over premium rates
charged by title insurers,55 although rate requests are rarely denied. Other
types of title insurer regulations imposed by some states are a requirement
that policy forms be approved by a state agency; prohibitions on writing
other kinds of insurance including mortgage insurance; and in one state,
52. The Connecticut Attorneys Title Insurance Company, for example, offers these ser-
vices directed particularly at their agent lawyers: a continuing legal education program on
conveyancing matters; newsletters and monographs on real property law; a staff of in-house
lawyers to answer troublesome legal questions; paralegals who will come to the private law-
yers' offices and aid in staff training; and available back title records. These types of services
are not only effective in attracting business but they also tend to avert problems that could
lead to insured loss claims.
53. ALTA's activities and its positions on occupational issues are well-reflected in Title
News, its periodical for members, published bimonthly.
54. On regulation of title insurance companies generally, see D. BURKE, supra note 1,
chs. 5-8 (1986); Phillips & Butler, supra note 8; Quiner, Title Insurance and the Title Insur-
ance Industry, 22 DRAKE L. REV. 721, 723-26 (1973); Uri, supra note 48, at 92-93.
55. D. BURKE, supra note 1, at 139. On the effects of rate regulation in one state, Texas,
see Phillips & Butler, supra note 8, at 652-53. States in which title insurance companies are
more rigorously regulated than most of the others include Texas, New York, and
Pennsylvania.
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Iowa, prohibition on private companies writing title insurance in the state."
Prevailing state regulation of title insurance is sufficient for the federal Mc-
Carran-Ferguson Act to apply and exempt this form of insurance from the
federal antitrust laws, but ancillary activities of title insurers, such as es-
crow services,57 title searches and examinations,5 and presumably operation
of joint title plants, are subject to the federal antitrust laws.59
Another federal statute of relevance to title insurers is the previously
discussed provision of the Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act prohibit-
ing referral fees and fee splitting in real estate settlement service transac-
tions.60 This provision, although favored by many title insurers, is a major
competitive restriction on the insurers' efforts to attract referral business.
Unauthorized practice of law proscriptions also have been held applicable
to title companies in the drafting of legal documents, providing title opin-
ions when insurance has not been applied for, and providing escrow and
closing services." In recent years, however, there have been very few re-
ported unauthorized practice cases involving title companies,62 which indi-
cates greater forbearance by both the bar and the courts, and probably, as
well, some reluctance by title insurers and their agents to perform tasks
they believe would be contested as illegal behavior. Unauthorized practice
relative to title companies has become, if not a dead issue, a quiescent one.
56. Iowa has long prohibited the writing of title insurance in the state. IOWA CODE
ANN. § 515.48(10) (West 1949). On the Iowa prohibition, see Note, Iowa's Prohibition of
Title Insurance - Leadership or Folly?, 33 DRAKE L. REv. 683 (1983-84). In 1985, the Iowa
Housing Financing Authority, a state agency, was authorized to offer and operate a financially
self-sustaining program of title guaranties on Iowa real property, in effect a form of title insur-
ance, no title to be guaranteed prior to 1987. IowA CODE ANN. § 220.91 (Supp. 1987).
57. United States v. Title Ins. Rating Bureau of Ariz., 700 F.2d 1247 (9th Cir. 1983).
58. In 1985 the Federal Trade Commission alleged illegal activity in thirteen states by
six title insurance companies in combining to fix prices, through state authorized rating bu-
reaus, for title search and examination services. An FTC judge found five companies in viola-
tion in only two states, Connecticut and Wisconsin. Title search and examination services were
held not to constitute the business of insurance so as to qualify for exemption under the Mc-
Carran-Ferguson Act. In re Ticor Title Ins. Co., F.T.C. No. 9190 (Dec. 22, 1986). On this
case, see Uri, supra note 48; Christie, Competition and the Title Insurance Industry, REAL
EST. REV., Summer 1986, at 62 (response to Uri).
59. On applicability of the federal antitrust laws to the activities of title insurers, see D.
BURKE, supra note 1, at ch. 7; Mascari, Rove & Christie, Antitrust Exemption and Risk,
TITLE NEWS, Aug.-Sept. 1983, at 11; Uri, supra note 48.
60. See supra note 24 and accompanying text.
61. Cases are cited and discussed in D. BURKE, supra note 1, ch. 8, and Payne, supra
note 31.
62. Two recent cases are Coffee County Abstract & Title Co. v. State ex rel. Norwood,
445 So. 2d 852 (Ala. 1984) (title company and its agent prohibited from filling out deed forms
or conducting real estate closings at which they or their employees give legal advice or express
legal opinions), and Blodinger v. Broker's Title, Inc., 224 Va. 201, 294 S.E.2d 876 (1982)
(justiciable controversy held to exist in attorneys' declaratory judgment proceeding against
title insurance company agent alleging unauthorized practice of law).
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D. Lenders
Most land purchases are financed in substantial part with borrowed
money, the land serving as security for the loan. The lenders' service of
making loan funds available is usually crucial to land sales taking place,
and closings of sales contracts are often contingent on the arrangement of
adequate secured funding. In most places, the mortgage is the customary
form of security used in financing land sales, but credit extensions are often
statistically categorized under the heading of mortgage loans whether the
underlying security is a mortgage, a trust deed, or some other close-variant
of a mortgage. Mortgage loans are regularly made to finance land
purchases and can therefore become an essential step in the land transfer
process. But it is common, as well, for owners to borrow on the security of
their land for other purposes. Land is such a valuable asset that its owners
can use it to borrow funds for an endless variety of purposes, on-site con-
struction being one of the most frequent.
The overwhelming proportion of mortgage loans is held by institutional
lenders that specialize in this form of finance. These lenders fall into a
number of well-recognized sub-groups. Fragmentation is typically sharper
and distinctions generally more important than among subsets of brokers,
lawyers, or title insurers involved in the land transfer process. The major
private institutional mortgage lenders, in order of the total amount of out-
standing real estate mortgage loans they hold, are savings and loan associa-
tions, commercial banks, life insurance companies, and savings banks. The
total amount of real estate mortgage loans held by these institutions in
1985 was about one and a half trillion dollars, up from less than half a
trillion dollars in 1970." The principal outlet for savings and loan associa-
tion funds is real estate mortgage loans, and in many periods this has been
true of savings bank funds as well. Commercial banks and life insurance
companies, although allocating large sums to mortgage loans on real estate,
channel most of their funds into other kinds of loans and investments. In
addition to the four major types of private institutional mortgage lenders,
large volumes of mortgage loans are held by federally-chartered credit
agencies and mortgage pools.64 Also, individuals, particularly sellers who
are financing buyers by means of purchase-money mortgages, hold a sizable
63. As of 1985, these institutions held a total of $1,337 billion in construction, long-term
mortgage, and land loans, allocated as follows: savings and loan associations, $658 billion;
commercial banks, $401 billion; life insurance companies, $168 billion; and savings banks,
$110 billion. U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES
1987, at 488, table 820 (1986) [hereinafter STATISTICAL ABSTRACT]. Total real estate secured
mortgage debt outstanding in the United States as of 1985 was $2,250 billion. Id. at 489, table
822.
64. As of 1985, these agencies held $189 billion in real estate mortgage debt, and mort-
gage pools held $392 billion. Id. at 488, table 820.
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volume of mortgage loans. The various subgroups of mortgage lenders are
specialized to some extent in the types of properties on which they hold
mortgage loans; although all the major subgroups, except life insurance
companies, are concentrated most heavily in mortgages on one to four-unit
family homes. Life insurance companies' principal mortgage holdings are of
commercial and industrial properties, with commercial banks and savings
and loans having large mortgage holdings on these types of properties as
well. The federally-chartered credit agencies hold the most farm mortgages,
and savings and loans hold the most apartment house mortgages. Commer-
cial banks and savings and loans dominate construction lending." 5
In terms of relevance to the land transfer process, originators of mort-
gage loans should be distinguished from those who later purchase this form
of debt. Originators make the decisions as to whether or not to loan, negoti-
ate loan terms, and advance loan funds on the security of land interests. In
many instances, the originators continue to hold the mortgage loans they
originate until the loans are paid off or otherwise terminated, but increas-
ingly, originators are selling their loans in the secondary market. A vast
secondary market in mortgages has developed in the United States with
federally-chartered credit agencies contributing greatly to its successful op-
eration. 6 These agencies buy already-originated mortgages from institu-
tional lenders, often at prices and on terms fixed in advance. Mortgage ac-
quisitions by these agencie* have had a variety of favorable results,
including increasing loan funds available for mortgages and increasing
mortgage liquidity. The federally-chartered agencies most involved in sec-
ondary market operations have been the Federal National Mortgage Asso-
ciation (FNMA), the Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation
(FHLMC), and the Government National Mortgage Association (GNMA).
Many of the mortgages acquired by these institutions have been insured or
guaranteed by either the Federal Housing Administration (FHA) or the
Veterans Administration (VA), both of which are federal agencies.
It is estimated that recently as high as sixty-five to seventy percent of
all new mortgage loans annually have been sold in the secondary market.6"
65. On various types of institutions' holdings of different kinds of loans as of 1985, see
id.
66. Except peripherally, the secondary mortgage market and the federally chartered
agencies operating in this market are beyond the scope of this article. On this market and
these agencies, see A. DOWNS, THE REVOLUTION IN REAL ESTATE FINANCE chs. 12 & 13
(1985); J. TuCCILLO, HOUSING FINANCE, A CHANGING SYSTEM IN THE REAGAN ERA 35-43,
75-79 (1983); Malloy, The Secondary Mortgage Market - A Catalyst for Change in Real
Estate Transactions, 39 Sw. L.J. 991 (1986). For an introductory description of this market,
see R. JOHNSON & T. HENDERSON, REAL ESTATE FINANCE 263-68 (1985).
67. Malloy, supra note 66, at 1003. In 1987, the percentage of new mortgage loans
being absorbed by the secondary market dropped substantially because of the high percentage
of new adjustable rate mortgages in 1987, a type of mortgage less attractive in the secondary
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Persons who have acquired mortgages and wish to sell them are provided,
by the secondary market, with a ready outlet in which there are purchasers
willing to buy. Many institutional lenders shift their mortgage holdings by
buying or selling in the secondary market and operate in this market to
further perceived investment opportunities, to avoid excessive holdings of
long-term loans, to keep their asset allocations within legal limits, or be-
cause they need cash. Also, some mortgage lenders do not have the organi-
zation or staff to originate mortgages effectively or in markets that they
want to tap outside areas where they maintain offices. Therefore, some
lenders must rely on the secondary market for some or all of the mortgages
they acquire. Although mortgage loan originators, as direct participants,
are tremendously important to the land transfer process, secondary market
purchasers are important influences on this process as well. To the extent
that originators expect that the mortgage loans they are making will, or
quite possibly may, be sold in the secondary market, the preferences of buy-
ers in that market will be taken into consideration in determining which
loans to make, the terms, and the form. Thus, resale marketability is usu-
ally a consideration during the mortgage loan origination stage. Large
volumes of real estate mortgages are originated by savings and loans, sav-
ings banks, commercial banks, and to a much lesser extent by life insurance
companies. 8 Each of these categories of lenders also buys and sells exten-
sively in the secondary mortgage market, although some individual institu-
tions are far more active in this market than'others.
Many lenders also rely on mortgage banks, also known as mortgage
companies, to originate mortgages for them. Mortgage banks are in the
business of originating mortgages for others, ordinarily for regular custom-
ers who are expected to take the loans.89 The major customers of mortgage
banks are life insurance companies,7" but all types of mortgage lenders ac-
quire mortgages through these intermediaries to some extent. Most mort-
gages originated by mortgage banks are on single-family dwellings, but
market. The Secondary Market for Mortgages, N.Y. Times, Jan. 31, 1988, at F1I, col. 1.
68. See infra note 71.
69. On mortgage banks, see Downs, An Encompassing View of the World of Real Es-
tate Finance, MORTGAGE BANKING, April 1987, at 25; H. HOAGLAND & L. STONE, REAL
ESTATE FINANCE ch. 15 (5th ed. 1973); M. MADISON & J. DWYER, THE LAW OF REAL ES-
TATE FINANCING § 2.03 (1981). Mortgage brokers are usually distinguished from mortgage
bankers, the brokers being intermediaries in placing loans who do not risk their own capital.
H. HOAGLAND & L. STONE, supra, at 282-83. On mortgage brokers also see D. BURKE, supra
note 2, ch. 9.
70. In placing and servicing mortgage loans on commercial properties in major markets,
some large life insurance companies are increasingly bypassing mortgage banks and relying
instead on the insurers' regional offices. This direct action may be cheaper and increase market
share. It also avoids the need to rely on the mixed loyalties of those mortgage banks that act as
correspondents for more than one lender. Oharenko & Kolomayets, Mortgage Correspondents,
Local Eyes and Ears, MORTGAGE BANKING, Sept. 1987, at 65.
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these institutions also do a smaller volume of commercial, apartment house,
and construction loan origination. In recent years, in dollar volume, mort-
gage banks have been originating about one-fourth of all mortgages on one
to four-unit family dwellings, commercial and savings banks about one-
fourth of all mortgages, and savings and loans almost one-half of all mort-
gagesY.7 To generate business, mortgage bankers maintain close ties with
real estate brokers and developers as well as with lenders. During the short
period of time between mortgage origination and disposal, mortgage banks
usually finance their mortgage holdings with bank credit lines. This tempo-
rary holding of mortgages is known as warehousing. Mortgage banks re-
ceive modest fees for originations but it is mortgage servicing that generally
makes them profitable, origination feeding the servicing work. When mort-
gages are disposed of by mortgage banks, the mortgage banks usually re-
tain the servicing. Servicing is the collection from mortgagors of interest
and principal installment payments, remittance of proceeds to the lenders,
making certain that insurance and property taxes on the mortgaged prop-
erty have been paid, and taking corrective action when borrowers are delin-
quent in their payments. Payment for servicing is a small percentage of the
outstanding loan balance, typically one-quarter to one-half of one percent
per year. There are substantial economies of scale to mortgage servicing
and it can be very profitable if a sufficient volume of mortgages is being
serviced. Most mortgage banks are small local businesses, but a few are
large organizations operating in many states. Other institutions, particu-
larly some savings and loans, operate quite similarly to mortgage banks in
that they originate mortgages for prompt resale and also do mortgage
servicing.
Tremendous sums of money are required to satisfy demands made on
the real estate mortgage market. Where do lenders acquire the funds they
loan on the security of real estate? Sources vary among different types of
lenders. Savings and loan associations and savings banks rely primarily on
depositors for their mortgage loan funds. Most of these depositors are indi-
viduals who place their savings, generally rather small amounts of money,
in interest-bearing accounts with these institutions. Because of the nature of
their depositors and their depositors' accounts, savings and loan associations
71. Downs, supra note 69, at 26. In 1986, of $438 billion in mortgage loans originated
by institutions on one- to four-unit family dwellings, mortgage banks originated 30%, savings
and loans 40%, commercial and savings banks 29%, and life insurance companies 1%. MORT-
GAGE BANKING, July 1987, at 121. Of the $604 billion in all types of long-term real estate
mortgage loans originated in 1986 by institutions, mortgage banks originated 24%, savings and
loans originated 36%, commercial and savings banks originated 34%, and life insurance com-
panies originated 6%. Id. An indication of how extensively mortgage market volume can fluc-
tuate in a short period is that in dollar volume total institutional originations of real estate
mortgages on one- to four-unit family dwellings increased by 82% in 1986 over 1985, and on
all types of real estate mortgage loans the increase in 1986 over 1985 was 64%. Id.
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and savings banks are often referred to as thrifts.7 2 Commercial banks' ma-
jor sources of funds are deposits by many individuals in small accounts,
large deposits mostly by businesses, and trust assets of trusts administered
by bank trust departments. Life insurance companies acquire their mort-
gage investment funds mostly from policy premiums, although they now
manage massive amounts of pension fund moneys, some of which go into
mortgage loans. Simply put, the thrifts and commercial banks seek to make
a profit on their mortgage loans by borrowing money from depositors and
relending at higher rates than their borrowing costs. Life insurance compa-
nies seek a similar profit spread between the cost of money to them as in-
surers and the money they receive on the mortgage loans they make. The
institutional lenders also impose administrative and management fees in
connection with their mortgage loans that contribute to the institutions'
profitability.
Mortgage-backed securities provide an added source of funding for
mortgages primarily through secondary market transactions, and have
brought an enormous amount of money into mortgage finance, much of it
from investors who previously had little or no interest in mortgages as an
investment outlet.7 Since 1970, when these types of securities were first
supported on a large scale by federal agency guarantees, a vast market in
them has developed, with over one-fourth of the nearly three trillion dollars
in real estate mortgages outstanding in the United States having been
securitized.7 4 Securitized mortgages usually are backed by pools of mort-
gages; the securities are issued in bond, note, or certificate form; and their
principal and interest commonly are guaranteed by a public or private insti-
tution. Their attractions over most unsecuritized mortgages include greater
marketability, risk reduction through guarantees and pooling, and a variety
of offerings appealing to a wide range of investors.7 5 Initially, most mort-
gages that were securitized were on residential properties, mostly single
family homes, but recently a substantial volume of mortgages have been
securitized on such commercial properties as office buildings, hotels, and
72. Credit unions also are sometimes referred to as thrifts.
73. On mortgage-backed securities, see A. DOWNS, supra note 66, at 249-62; Heller,
Securitization, NAT'L REAL EST. INVESTOR, Aug. 1984, at 76; Malloy, supra note 66, at 1003-
10; Strine, New Commercial Devices - Mortgage-Backed Securities, 13 REAL PROP., PROB.
& TR. J. 1011 (1978); Comment, The Secondary Mortgage Market and State Regulation of
Real Estate Financing, 36 EMORY L.J. 971 (1987).
74. As of late 1987, outstanding real estate mortgage debt was $2.8 billion, of which
$641 million was in mortgage-pooled securities insured or guaranteed by federally chartered
agencies. FEDERAL RESERVE BULL., Jan. 1988, at A39. In addition, there is a substantial vol-
ume of real estate mortgage securities not backed by these agencies.
75. New forms of mortgage-backed securities keep coming onto the market in efforts to
increase investor appeal. Some of these are discussed in Hu, Proliferation of Mortgage-Backed
Securities, MORTGAGE BANKING, Sept. 1985, at 24, and Kirschner, MBSs Made Simple,
MORTGAGE BANKING, May 1987, at 67, 74.
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shopping centers.7 6 In most instances, the securities are backed by previ-
ously originated mortgages assembled by the issuer and therefore are sec-
ondary mortgage market instruments; but in the occasional very large mort-
gage transaction, the securities are issued when the mortgage is originated
and are part of the initial mortgage financing arrangement.7
Through the years, the principal issuers of mortgage-backed securities
have been the three federal government-chartered agencies that are most
active in the secondary mortgage market: FNMA, FHLMC, and GNMA.
Securities issued by these agencies are often purchased by investment banks
for resale to a broader market, and the investment banks have also acted as
placement agents for private issuers as well as issuing their own mortgage-
backed securities. Other private issuers typically have been insurance com-
panies, commercial banks, savings and loans, and large home builder com-
panies. A wide range of investors purchase mortgage-backed securities, in-
cluding many institutional lenders and pension funds. The thrifts have been
purchasing at least thirty percent of all new mortgage-backed securities, 8
and many individual investors also are finding these securities attractive.
The mortgage market is highly sensitive to interest rates and prevailing
market interest rates frequently change, consequently affecting who can
qualify for mortgage loans and terms of those mortgages. The mortgage
market is also competitive, and within narrow limits mortgage lenders com-
pete with one another for borrowers by offering various interest rates and
points,19 as well as providing options for other terms such as length of the
mortgage, acceptable loan-to-value ratio, amortization method, and prepay-
ment privileges. A variety of alternative mortgage instruments has emerged,
among the most important of which are adjustable or variable-rate mort-
gages. These instruments provide interest rates that periodically vary in ac-
cord with some index of inflation and deflation, thereby requiring borrowers
and lenders to share the risks of market volatility in interest rates.8" Lend-
76. On securitization of commercial real estate mortgages, see Richards, "Gradable and
Tradable": The Securitization of Commercial Real Estate Mortgages, 16 REAL EST. L.J. 99
(1987). Richards expresses doubts as to whether or not the market for securitized mortgages
on commercial properties will expand rapidly in the near future for offerings other than on
large projects in known real estate centers such as Manhattan.
77. For a list of large securitized mortgage originations between 1983 and 1986, see
Stevenson, Turning the Pieces into Securities, MORTGAGE BANKING, Oct. 1986, at 68, 73.
Each of the 17 originations appearing on this list is in excess of $100 million; the largest is for
$1.3 billion and was issued by Rockefeller Center Properties, Inc. for office buildings in New
York City.
78. See generally A. DOWNS, supra note 66, at 33.
79. Points refer to lender payment discounts, an added form of lender remuneration for
making loans. It is common practice for a lender to pay over to the borrower less than what
the borrower promises to pay back. This discounted amount is measured in terms of points,
each point being one percent of the face amount of the borrower's repayment obligation.
80. On alternative mortgage instruments, see Levin & Roberts, Future Forms of Fi-
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ers also offer mortgages tailored to the special needs of particular classes of
borrowers, such as graduated payment mortgages which are attractive to
young persons with increased earning potential" and others with low pre-
sent income, but whose income is expected to rise in a few years, and annu-
ity mortgages which are attractive to retired persons.82 Although real estate
mortgage lenders compete for borrowers, the risks of making unsatisfactory
loans are so great that lenders are generally cautious in their lending prac-
tices and commonly insist on loan terms, such as due-on-sale clauses and
stiff prepayment penalties, that tend to limit their risks. Mortgage loans can
turn out to be unsatisfactory because of such occurrences as borrower de-
fault, security depreciation, and escalating market interest rates. Mortgage
lending is a balance between keeping competitive and keeping profitable,
and it is conducted in a fluctuating interest rate market that requires regu-
lar reconsideration of lending criteria.
An important means of reducing risks to mortgage lenders is by shift-
ing risks to third parties through mortgage insurance or guarantees. Such
shifts long have been significant in expanding the housing market and in-
creasing the number of persons who can qualify for financing to purchase
their own homes. In many instances, lenders are more willing to make
mortgage loans on more favorable terms if a financially responsible third
party is underwriting some or all of the loan. Since the Depression of the
1930s, the federal government has been the principal underwriter of real
estate mortgages, although coverage is also available through private com-
panies. Federal government underwriting has been handled almost entirely
by two agencies, the Federal Housing Administration (FHA), that insures
- charges premiums to borrowers, and the Veterans Administration (VA),
that guarantees - charges no premiums.8 s The two federal agencies place
restrictions on the coverage they provide by restricting the amounts and
kinds of mortgage loans that they will underwrite. They have had a major
impact on the residential mortgage market, including the secondary market.
As of 1985, twenty-four percent of the long-term real estate mortgage loans
outstanding on one to four-unit family homes were federally insured or
nancing - Lending Devices Addressed to Inflation and Tight Money, in A.B.A. SECTION OF
REAL PROPERTY, PROBATE AND TRUST LAW, FINANCING REAL ESTATE DURING THE INFLA-
TIONARY 80s 31 (B. Strum ed. 1981). FEDERAL HOME LOAN BANK BOARD, ALTERNATIVE
MORTGAGE INSTRUMENTS RESEARCH STUDY (1977); Lea, The Margin of Success, SECOND-
ARY MORTGAGE MARKETS, Spring 1986, at 22 (recent declining market share of adjustable
rate mortgages).
81. FEDERAL HOME LOAN BANK BOARD, supra note 80, at 23.
82. Id. chs. 18 & 19.
83. On FHA and VA coverage, see G. NELSON & D. WHITMAN, REAL ESTATE FINANCE
LAW 754-64 (2d ed. 1985); Foster & Herzog, Mortgage Insurance: The Role of FHA, MORT-
GAGE BANKING, Nov. 1981, at 29; Waldo, The Role of Private Mortgage Insurance, MORT-
GAGE BANKING, Feb. 1982, at 31.
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guaranteed.8 ' This percentage has been considerably higher in some previ-
ous years.8 5 Mortgage insurance by private companies has expanded rapidly
and in some recent years new private underwriting of mortgage loans has
exceeded new coverage by FHA and VA combined. 8
Government regulation of most mortgage lending institutions is sub-
stantial, despite recent deregulatory moves.8 7 To a considerable extent, each
lender subgroup has been separately regulated with separate statutes, ad-
ministrative codes, and regulatory agencies for each major type of mortgage
lender such as savings and loans, savings banks, commercial banks, and
insurance companies. Extensive legal controls over lenders have been im-
posed by both state and federal governments, and the principal regulatory
objective generally has been to protect lender solvency. Lender insolvency
can result in severe losses to large numbers of depositors and insureds who
provide much of the lender funding and, if on a large enough scale, can also
have severe negative economic repercussions locally, regionally, and even
nationally. Protection of depositors and insureds is a high government prior-
ity, especially protection of the millions of persons whose savings and pre-
miums are entrusted to lending institutions. The regulatory approach to
protecting lender solvency has been to impose controls over such business
considerations as entry qualifications, reserves, borrowing limits, types of
loans that can be made, nonloan investments, interest rates and other prices
that can be paid or charged, geographical areas in which branches or sub-
sidiaries may be located, and the range of businesses that lenders may oper-
ate or own. Depository institutions - principally savings and loans, savings
banks, and commercial banks - have been subject to particularly rigorous
government regulation with a miscellany of federal statutes serving as the
84. STATISTICAL ABSTRACT, supra note 63, at 488, table 820.
85. E.g., 37% of these loans were federally insured in 1970. Id.
86. In 1986, the total of new mortgage insurance coverage was $128 billion, $46 billion
by private companies, and $82 billion by FHA and VA. In 1985, the totals were $87 billion,
$50 billion by private companies and $37 billion by FHA and VA. MORTGAGE BANKING, Feb.
1988, at 108. On private mortgage insurance, see G. NELSON & D. WHITMAN, REAL ESTATE
TRANSFER, FINANCE AND DEVELOPMENT 828-41 (3d ed. 1987); Mulherin, Private Mortgage
Insurers, SECONDARY MORTGAGE MARKETS, Feb. 1985, at 11; Pope, Private Mortgage Insur-
ers Stake New Claims, SECONDARY MORTGAGE MARKETS, Feb. 1984, at 18; Pollack & Stein-
bach, Mortgage Guarantee Insurance Risk Management in the 1980s, 3 HOUSING FIN. REV.
209 (1984). Private mortgage insurance typically covers only the top 20% to 25% of the
amount owed the lender, with premiums varying from 1.5% to .9% at closing, plus .7% to .55%
annually thereafter. Most mortgages insured have high loan to value ratios. On the relative
attractiveness of government and private mortgage insurance, see How Are Today's Lenders
Choosing Mortgage Insurance, MORGAGE BANKING, Feb. 1988, at 35.
87. On government regulation of mortgage lending institutions generally, see 19 J. AP-
PLEMAN, INSURANCE LAW AND PRACTICE §§ 10321-10620 (1982) (insurance company regu-
lation only); W. LOVETT, BANKING AND FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS LAW (1984); Benston, The
Regulation of Financial Services, in FINANCIAL SERVICES: CHANGING INSTITUTIONS AND
GOVERNMENT POLICY 28 (G. Benston ed. 1983) [hereinafter FINANCIAL SERVICES].
1988]
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principal legal basis of this control. ' s Most types of insurance companies
also have been closely regulated, but their regulation has been more heavily
concentrated at the state level than that of depository institutions. Mort-
gage banks and investment banks have been subject to less regulation than
most other institutions involved in mortgage lending.
It has long been recognized that politically acceptable government reg-
ulation could reduce, but not eliminate, risks of depository institution insol-
vency and that serious incidents of insolvency inevitably would occur. To
protect depositors when banks and savings and loans do become insolvent
and to discourage runs on such institutions when perceived to be in financial
trouble, the government has since the Depression of the 1930s provided de-
posit insurance as an added means of protection.89 Today, most all deposi-
88. The following very limited sampling of important federal regulatory enactments per-
taining to depository institutions illustrates the range of government intervention in the affairs
of these institutions: The Home Owners' Loan Act of 1933, 12 U.S.C. §§ 1461-1468 (1982)
(authorizing the chartering of savings and loan associations); Title IV of the National Housing
Act, 12 U.S.C. § 1725 (1982) (establishing the Federal Savings and Loan Insurance Corpora-
tion); Garn-St. Germaine Depository Institutions Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-320, 96 Stat.
1469 (codified as amended mostly in scattered sections of 12 U.S.C.) (financially bolstering
depository institutions and broadening their source of funds and range of permissible loans);
Bank Holding Company Act of 1956, 12 U.S.C. §§ 1841-1846, 1849 (1982) (giving the Fed-
eral Reserve Board extensive control over bank holding companies); Glass-Steagall Act, ch. 89,
48 Stat. 162 (1933) (codified as amended in 12 U.S.C. §§ 347(a), 347(b), 412 (1982))
(prohibiting national banks from engaging in the brokerage and underwriting of securities);
McFadden Act, ch. 191, 44 Stat. 1224 (1927) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 12
U.S.C.) (limiting interstate banking); Truth in Lending Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1601-1667e (1982)
(requiring lender disclosures to borrowers when making residential mortgage and other con-
sumer loans); Home Mortage Disclosure Act of 1975, 12 U.S.C. §§ 2801-2809 (1982) (impos-
ing obligations on depository institutions to make available for public inspection information
on mortgage lending in particular areas as a means of discouraging redlining). The Real Es-
tate Settlement Procedures Act (RESPA), 12 U.S.C. §§ 2603, 2604 (1982), also imposes obli-
gations on depository institutions as well as on other mortgage lenders, including the obligation
of making a specified settlement statement and settlement procedures booklet available to most
residential real estate mortgage borrowers. The Act's disclosure requirements are of interest
more for what they no longer include than for what they now require. Due to lender and
lawyer objections, more stringent disclosure requirements in earlier versions of the Act were
repealed. On the evolution of RESPA disclosure objectives and requirements, see D. BURKE,
AMERICAN CONVEYANCING PATTERNS ch. 6 (1978); Stoppello, Federal Regulation of Home
Mortgage Settlement Costs: RESPA and Its Alternatives, 63 MINN. L. REV. 367 (1979).
The federal statutory control pattern for depository institutions is fragmented and ex-
tremely complex, as the above examples indicate. The fragmentation and complexity is en-
hanced by extensive amendments to many of the statutes after their original enactment and by
a vast body of supplemental federal administrative regulations. The states, of course, also have
promulgated a substantial body of statutes and regulations imposing added controls on deposi-
tory institutions.
89. On deposit insurance, see Edmister, Bank Deregulation and Deposit Reform: Some
Hard Questions for Congress, 104 BANKING L.J. 42 (1987); Fischel, Rosenfield & Stillman,
The Regulation of Banks and Bank Holding Companies, 73 VA. L. REv. 301, 312-18 (1987);
Isaac, The Role of Deposit Insurance in the Emerging Financial Services Industry, I YALE J.
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tory institutions have deposit insurance coverage. Top legal coverage of
each depositor in each institution is $100,000, and insurance premiums are
paid by the depository institution. The major insurers are two federal gov-
ernment agencies, the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC),
which insures deposit accounts of commercial banks, and the Federal Sav-
ings and Loan Insurance Corporation (FSLIC), which insures savings and
loan accounts. The insuring agencies have three alternatives in case an in-
stitution fails or is in imminent danger of failing. They can pay off insured
depositors, provide financial assistance to the institution, or arrange for the
assets and liabilities of the failing institution to be taken over by another
institution with supplemental funding aid from the insurer. This latter rem-
edy has been the usual course pursued and generally has protected all credi-
tors including those with over $100,000 in deposits. Deposit insurance, de-
spite recent severe loss problems, is generally considered a major success
because of the depositor protection and enhanced depository institution sta-
bility it has provided.
Deregulation of government control of business has been a major
movement over the past decade or so and has received strong support from
within the Reagan Administration and from many business interests. Sub-
stantial legal deregulation of the financial services segment of the economy,
especially of the depository institutions, has been one'of the principal objec-
tives of the movement. A few highly significant steps have been taken to
deregulate banks and thrifts, and more deregulation of these institutions
may be forthcoming although an acceleration in bank and thrift failures
and the Federal Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation operating seri-
ously in the red have precipitated something of a reregulation backlash. 90
The deregulation movement has generated many reform proposals and sub-
stantial debate as to how extensively, and in what manner, financial services
should be deregulated. The most important recent accomplishments in der-
egulating depository institutions are two federal statutes, the Monetary
Control Act of 198091 and the Garn-St. Germaine Depository Institutions
Act of 1982.92 Both Acts deal with a number of problems, but are particu-
larly concerned with trying to bolster financially the savings and loans.
ON REG. 195 (1984).
90. See, e.g., conference proceedings, The Challenges of Increased Regulatory Supervi-
sion, 6 ANN. REv. OF BANKING LAW 221, 223-313 (1987). Pressure for reregulation is evident
in the Competitive Equality Banking Act of 1987, Pub. L. No. 100-86, 101 Stat. 552 (1987),
that includes a $10.8 billion bailout of the Federal Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation's
insurance fund through authorization of FSLIC bond sales, prohibits creation of new nonbank
banks, and places a temporary freeze on further bank expansion into insurance, securities un-
derwriting, and real estate brokerage and development.
91. 12 U.S.C. §§ 226 note, 248, 461 (1982).
92. Pub. L. No. 97-320, 96 Stat. 1469 (codified as amended mostly in scattered sections
of 12 U.S.C. (1982)). For a consideration of bank deregulation back to the 1960s, see R.
LITAN, WHAT SHOULD BANKS Do? 33-59 (1987).
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These institutions have serious financial troubles that the Acts are aimed at
alleviating by allowing more freedom of action. The 1980 Act, among other
provisions, authorizes most depository institutions to offer interest bearing
checking accounts (NOW accounts), provides for a phase-out of interest
rate ceilings on depository institutions' time and savings accounts, and gives
savings and loans the right to invest up to twenty percent of their assets in
consumer loans.
The Garn-St. Germaine Act, passed two years later, goes much fur-
ther.93 Among its many provisions are those enabling federal deposit insur-
ing agencies to offer increased assistance to depository institutions in finan-
cial distress, making short-term capital assistance available to depository
institutions with low net worth, and expanding substantially the range of
deposit accounts that savings and loans and other thrifts can offer and the
types of loans they can make, including commercial loans and an expanded
volume of consumer loans. The Act also permits depository institutions to
offer money market deposit accounts, a tremendous source of new funding.
The Act also makes due-on-sale clauses in real estate mortgage loans more
enforceable, which particularly helps the thrifts by allowing them to termi-
nate many unfavorable long-term loans. In effect, the two Acts seek to revi-
talize depository institutions, especially the savings and loans. In the course
of doing so, many of the legal distinctions between thrifts and commercial
banks have been eroded, and the thrifts have been made less dependent on
real estate mortgage lending as the basis of their business.
II. NEW DEVELOPMENTS
Until quite recently, land transfer servicing was characterized by
groups of specialty firms each with its own niche or business preserve and
with little or no interest by one group in invading the functional sphere of
the other. Each group was relatively autonomous. Residential land sale con-
tract and closing work was something of an exception to this, as in many
93. Helpful summations of this very complex Act appear in NEW YORK UNIVERSITY
SCHOOL OF LAW, 1983 ANN. SURV. OF AM. LAW 757-70 (1984), and Gorinson & Manishin,
Garn-St. Germaine: A Harbinger of Change, 40 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1313 (1983). There
have, of course, also been important deregulatory actions by administrative bodies, for exam-
ple, the Federal Reserve Board's 1983 revision of a bank holding company regulation, Regula-
tion Y, 12 C.F.R. § 225 (1983), and the 1983 Federal Home Loan Bank Board's easing of
permissible terms for mortgage loans made by savings and loans and savings banks, 12 C.F.R.
§§ 545.32-.45 (1984). The states, too, have been active in deregulation of financial institutions.
An example is the interstate banking permitted by some of the New England states. The New
England experience is discussed in Eagan, The Constitutionality of the New England Inter-
state Banking Experiment, 4 ANN. REV. OF BANKING LAW 213 (1985). Over thirty states now
permit some out-of-state banks to enter and provide a full array of banking services but with
substantial restrictions on entry. See Simonson, Full-Service Interstate Banking Statutes: The
Conditions of Entry, I I OKLA. CITY L. REV. 723 (1986).
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communities private law firms shared the market for this work with other
service groups, each group performing much the same tasks. For the most
part, firms doing land transfer servicing work were local in character, lo-
cally owned and operated, and perceived land to be a highly localized com-
modity. There were some exceptions, however. Life insurance companies
and some of the big urban banks made real estate mortgage loans in differ-
ent sections of the country and the federal government operated nationally
in mortgage lending and underwriting. Also, most title and mortgage insur-
ance coverage had become centralized in underwriters that did business na-
tionally or in large multistate regions. But overwhelmingly, land transfer
servicers were local enterprises conducted by firms operating in but one lo-
cality. Apart from some of the big lenders, these firms were small to moder-
ate in size, not part of American big business.
Over the past decade or so, significant changes have occurred in land
transfer servicing and in many of the firms performing this servicing work.
Indications are that further important changes will occur in the near future.
Among the most striking changes are that some of the nation's largest cor-
porations have entered the land transfer servicing field in a major way and
others with a record of some activity in the field have vastly accelerated
their participation and planned participation. In addition, some of the es-
tablished moderate-sized firms in the field have expanded considerably. The
obvious goal of each of these firms is to capture a substantial share of the
land transfer services market, and greater big-firm market concentration
already is apparent. Small local firms remain important but many are los-
ing ground to large firms, including the new entrants onto the land transfer
servicing scene. The large firms almost universally are expanding their land
transfer operations geographically, many of them operating or planning to
operate nationally. Innovative and aggressive marketing of land transfer
services also has marked some of these expanded ventures. The usual ex-
pansion is by company owned outlets; however, in real estate brokerage,
franchising has been one form of growth, the francisers being large compa-
nies and the franchise outlets mostly small locally owned firms. Franchising
can bring advertising, training, and more efficient management benefits to
those owning franchised outlets.
A well-publicized effort at big firm expansion is the push by the large
commercial banks to extend their interstate operations,9" with the eventual
goal, it seems, of a small number of giant banks having nationwide net-
works of branches. Although real estate mortgage lending is not the princi-
pal business of commercial banks, overall they are important real estate
mortgage lenders, and the increased market concentration that interstate
94. On interstate banking, see Morin Center for Banking Law Studies, Interstate Ex-
pansion: An Industry Banking On Change, 4 ANN. REV. OF BANKING LAW 95 (1985); R.
LITAN, supra note 92, at 35-41.
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banking will bring can have important consequences for land transfer ser-
vicing. It can be argued that full-service interstate banking on a large scale
will reduce risks of bank failure and increase competition in some localities,
but it could also decrease the sense of lender responsibility for local devel-
opment and local prosperity. In addition, it is ultimately likely to create
individual banks unprecedented in the United States for their wealth and
influence. Limited interstate banking already is a reality through such
means as nonbank banks: bank holding-company subsidiaries that make
commercial loans or accept demand deposits but not both, and regional
banking arrangements of the kind authorized in much of New England.
Further extensions of interstate banking seem probable.
Still another striking change taking place in land transfer servicing is
that the relatively autonomous business preserves of major land transfer
servicing groups are being invaded. Serious efforts are being made to inte-
grate vertically some steps in the land transfer process. Through marketing
and referral linkages, still further consolidation of land transfer functions is
being attempted. There is even talk, however improbable the prospect, of
one-stop arrangements in which consumers could obtain all financial ser-
vices, including land transfer services, from one all-purpose firm.95 Clearly,
the fragmentation of land transfer service groupings is giving way to pres-
sures for overlapping and combining. This integration push by financial ser-
vices firms extends well beyond land transfer services. Among commercial
banks in particular there is a strong move to permit these institutions much
broader securities underwriting powers and the right to offer mutual funds,
sell insurance, and invest in real estate.96
Which large corporations are seeking major shares of the land transfer
servicing market? A recent study lists fifteen giant corporations that are
new or vastly expanding providers of land transfer services.9" These compa-
95. Roulac, Should Real Estate Brokerages Be Supermarkets or Corner Groceries?,
REAL EST. REV., Winter 1985, at 78; Whitman, Bundling and Settlement Service Costs, Ti-
TLE NEWS, July-Aug. 1985, at 32, 70. An argument for one-stop service is that consumers
might shop much more vigorously for a single package of services with a single price attached
than for separate services separately priced, and that prices would thereby be forced down.
Whitman, supra, at 70. At present, home buyers do little if any comparative price shopping
for land transfer services, except perhaps for mortgage loans. But for the view that the integra-
tion of lending, title insurance, and escrow services would induce higher rather than lower
prices, see Owen, supra note 48, at 956.
96. On bank financial product diversification, see R. LITAN, supra note 92.
97. SMR RESEARCH CORPORATION, THE CONSOLIDATION OF THE U.S. MORTGAGE IN-
DUSTRY (1986). This excellent study describes the activities of the 15 selected corporations in
mortgage and related fields and analyzes their strategies and prospects for success in acquiring
market share. SMR Research Corporation is a private business research firm that has special-
ized in study of the financial services industry. It is located in Budd Lake, New Jersey. A
summary of the mortgage research study appears in Feldstein, Invasion of the Mortgage
Snatchers, MORTGAGE BANKING, Dec. 1986, at 10.
Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 22, No. 3 [1988], Art. 1
https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol22/iss3/1
LAND TRANSFERS
nies differ considerably in their primary businesses. Two are principally re-
tailers, Sears and K Mart; two automobile manufacturers, General Motors
and Ford; two container manufacturers, American Can (now Primerica)"
and Owens-Illinois; one securities broker, Merrill Lynch; two consumer fi-
nance companies, Household International and Beneficial; one bank, Cit-
icorp; and five insurance companies, Metropolitan Life, Prudential, Trav-
elers, John Hancock, and Fireman's Fund. The fifteen were selected
because of their aggressive efforts to penetrate and expand their positions in
the real estate mortgage market and frequently, as well, real estate broker-
age. Most of the fifteen are new to land transfer servicing. Some, including
Citicorp, Metropolitan Life, and Prudential, have a long history of mort-
gage lending but recently have diversified and greatly expanded their land
transfer servicing efforts." Other big corporations could be added to the list
of fifteen, including J.C. Penney, Equitable Insurance, and Weyerhauser,
although less aggressively expansive in their plans.'0 0 In addition, most of
the major title insurance underwriters are now owned by large corporate
parents.01°
Purchase of existing established companies or their assets has been a
frequent means by which large corporations have moved into land transfer
servicing or have quickly expanded in this type of work. Most of these ac-
quisitions have been sizable and costly but have resulted in the acquirers'
immediate ascendancy in the field. For example, General Motors, through a
subsidiary, moved in one month from zero activity in mortgage servicing to
the second largest such servicer in the United States by acquiring the ser-
vicing portfolios of two companies.' Also, Metropolitan Life spent almost
half a billion dollars to purchase both a mortgage banking firm and Cen-
98. Primerica has disposed of its manufacturing operations and is now principally a
financial services company.
99. As to Citicorp, the SMR Research Corporation study states:
[Tihe nature of Citicorp's approach to, and interest in, the mortgage business has
changed radically. Citicorp now approaches the mortgage business as a bank, but also as
a thrift, as a mortgage banker, and a consumer finance company. Citicorp is, indeed, no
longer a bank, but a financial services company. Its unique institutional form, its great
geographic spread, and its recently formed, unparalleled ambitions in the mortgage busi-
ness (which go beyond those of any bank) make it fit naturally into the "newcomers"
group.
SMR RESEARCH CORPRATION, supra note 97, at 68.
100. Id. at 16-17. The recent movement of large nonfinancial enterprises into financial
services, particularly banking, is noted by R. LITAN, supra note 92, at 46-47. Litan also lists
the varied financial services activities of some of these firms, including mortgage banking. Id.
at 79, 114-17.
101. For example, Chicago Title is owned by Allegheny Corporation, Lawyers Title by
Universal Leaf Tobacco, Commonwealth Land Title by Reliance Insurance, and American
Title by Meridian Bank.
102. SMR RESEARCH CORPORATION, supra note 97, at 24.
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tury 21, the big franchise real estate broker," 3 and Ford paid half a billion
dollars for the nation's eighth largest thrift, an important mortgage origina-
tor and servicer10 4 All of these transactions occurred in the mid-1980s, and
the buyers expect to expand each of their acquisitions. Expansion through
acquisition usually has involved purchase of successful going businesses, but
some important expansion moves have been acquisitions of financially
troubled savings and loans and banks by large private financial institutions.
Some of these latter takeovers have been made possible by large capital
contributions from the federal agencies that insure the deposits of insolvent
thrifts and banks, the resuscitation avoiding complete liquidation of the
failed entities and reducing outlays by the federal agencies under their in-
surance agreements. 05 One to-be-expected result of expansionary moves of
big companies in land transfer servicing is that the largest firms in the field
have an increasingly large market share. This has been particularly noticea-
ble in residential mortgage lending, in which the twenty-five largest origina-
tors among the 15,000 companies in this phase of land transfer servicing
now have an unprecedented twenty-five percent of the origination
market.106
The obvious motives behind big corporations' moves into land transfer
servicing operations or dramatic expansions in this field obviously are to
increase profits and be more successful in this respect than if they allocated
their resources elsewhere. Cost cutting, economies of scale that may come
from increased volume, and improved marketing are part of these calcula-
tions as to profit prospects. Particularly significant are the possibilities of
enhanced profits by vertical integration and other forms of production or
distribution linkage.107 The land transfer process consists of a succession of
operations, and controlling work flow between operations can be very profit-
able, especially when done on a large scale. This control can come by one
firm itself being a multiservice provider and making package offers to cus-
tomers or by influencing customers of one service to purchase another ser-
103. Id. at 81.
104. Id. at 77.
105. One much publicized expansion in real estate mortgage and related activities,
based largely on acquisition of troubled savings and loans, is that of a group headed by former
U.S. Treasury Secretary William E. Simon. See Stevenson, Simon's Blossoming Empire, N.Y.
Times, Aug. 18, 1987, at DI, col. 3; Hilder, Simon's Group Finds Building S&L Empire
Harder Than Expected, Wall St. J., Aug. 26, 1987, at 1, col. 1.
106. Feldstein, The Emerging Giants in Mortgage Finance, MORTGAGE BANKING, Nov.
1987, at 114, 117. Citicorp in 1986 was the largest originator, with $13.4 billion in residential
mortgage loans, followed by H.F. Ahmanson with $9.3 billion, and GMAC Mortgage Corp.
with $7.3 billion. Id. at 114. Although there have been some disappointments, most of the
large originators have been highly profitable. Id. at 119-20.
107. On the nature of vertical integration, see 0. WILLIAMSON, THE ECONOMIC INSTITU-
TIONS OF CAPITALISM chs. 4 & 5 (1985). Williamson contends that transaction cost economiz-
ing is the principal reason for decisions to integrate. Id. at 103.
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vice from the same firm. In residential land transfers, channeling ties be-
tween real estate brokers and lenders are close since as many as 80% of the
buyers ask their brokers for advice on which lender to use and most follow
the advice given."0 ' The financial benefits of such control or influence are
one reason for some of the large corporations now operating in the land
transfer servicing field owning both real estate brokerage and mortgage
origination operations.10 9 Real estate brokerage is expected to feed the
mortgage origination side of the business. Close broker-lender ties may in
addition reduce transaction costs and also the delays which irritate borrow-
ers, such as the time and effort required to process buyer loan applications.
Another feeder possibility, highly valued by some of the big new busi-
nesses in land transfer servicing, as it long has been to mortgage banks and
thrifts generally, is that between mortgage origination and mortgage servic-
ing. The originator normally can be and often is the servicer, and mortgage
servicing is financially attractive. So an important inducement to doing
origination work is acquiring the servicing that inevitably follows. Still an-
other feeder arrangement that some firms have been experimenting with is
for broker outlets to offer their home buyers discounts on items such as
home furnishings and rental moving vans, which are sold or rented by other
businesses that the parent company owns. In all of these feeder schemes,
care normally is taken not to make the tie-ins coercive so as to violate the
antitrust laws.
Diversification of services offered by an individual firm can enhance
profitability whether or not one kind of service is a feeder for another kind.
Separate and unrelated services can each be profitable. Increasing firm di-
versification is particularly pronounced in the financial services field, includ-
ing real estate mortgage lending. With increased diversification has come a
fading and shifting of traditional boundaries between lender subgroups,
mergers of different types of firms, and new kinds of competitors moving
into the field. Illustrative developments are some savings and loans becom-
108. SMR RESEARCH CORPORATION, supra note 97, at 114. Another recent study dis-
closed that nearly 90% of real estate brokers recommend one or more sources of financing to
their homebuying customers and 81% felt that their recommendations were always followed.
McFall, Outdo Your Competition, MORTGAGE BANKING, Dec. 1986, at 67. As to broker influ-
ence on prospective borrowers, also see Hobbs, Fifty Ways to Please Your Market, MORT-
GAGE BANKING, Dec. 1986, at 44, 54.
109. Examples of corporations with both substantial real estate brokerage and mortgage
operations are Sears, Metropolitan Life, and Prudential Insurance. How extensive the real
estate mortgage and brokerage overlap has become is indicated by the following:
In total, we believe that right now, out of all homes sold in the U.S., well over 40%
and possibly more than 50%, are being sold by real estate agents whose firms either own,
or are owned or franchised by, mortgage companies. This means nothing less than a real
merging of the two industries . . ..
SMR RESEARCH CORPORATION, supra note 97, at 108.
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ing full-service financial institutions; some commercial banks taking over
savings and loans; some savings and loans operating much like mortgage
banks, in certain instances establishing mortgage bank subsidiaries; and
nonbank banks spreading across the nation. In addition to the miscellany of
giant corporations, such as Sears and General Motors, that have been mov-
ing into mortgage lending, investment banks are becoming increasingly sig-
nificant, especially in the secondary market. However, they are also of im-
portance in the primary market, notably as intermediaries placing large
residential and commercial project mortgage loans.110 Thus the former ex-
clusive preserves within real estate mortgage lending, as well as in financial
services generally, are being infiltrated and distinctions among lending sub-
groups are becoming blurred.
Innovative and aggressive marketing typifies land transfer activities of
many big firms now operating in the field."' 1 Massive customer bases estab-
lished for other products are being targeted for sale of land transfer ser-
vices. General Motors Acceptance Corporation, for example, has done di-
rect mail mortgage solicitation of some of its automobile loan customers. 1
K Mart, the big chain retailer, has taken a different approach, renting
mortgage booth space in its stores to mortgage originators on a percentage
lease basis.113 Other companies with a large number of chain or branch
outlets are adding real estate mortgage origination to the non-real estate
land transfer services they sell. Beneficial at its consumer loan offices" 4 and
Merrill Lynch at its securities brokerage offices exemplify this change115
Prequalification of residential mortgage borrowers is another marketing de-
vice being tried. Persons interested in purchasing a home may in advance
obtain an evaluation of their mortgage credit potential, including how much
they may be able to borrow on the security of a home they may purchase,
what down payment will be needed, and what monthly payments will be
required. This evaluation is given by a lender but with no final commitment
to loan on the terms indicated. It is, however, helpful to buyers by showing
what they probably can afford and on what terms. Prequalification analyses
can be provided from distant locations by computer." 6 Real estate broker
loan originations by computer hookups with lenders are another innovation,
and one recent study indicates that about five percent of real estate brokers
110. A. DowNs, supra note 66, at 226-29; Heller, supra note 73, at 80.
111. Established smaller firms are under pressure to improve their marketing in response
to the innovative marketing of their large new competitors. See, e.g., Hobbs, supra note 108,
at 44.
112. SMR RESEARCH CORPORATION, supra note 97, at 117.
113. Id. at 13.
114. Id. at 14.
115. Id. at 89.
116. On mortgage prequalification, see Downs, supra note 69, at 38; Dailey, K-Martl
Margaretten Special, MORTGAGE BANKING, Dec. 1986, at 61.
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are originating mortgages in this way, most of them apparently chain bro-
kerage outlets.' Telephone mortgage origination, with mortgage appli-
cants contacting the lender by telephone using an 800 number, is being
utilized by Prudential, with the company's insurance agents often advising
their customers on pursuing this course. Much of the mortgage business
generated in this way has been refinancing."'
The obvious objective of all these computer and telephone mortgage
origination schemes is to cut costs by eliminating field office expense and in
some instances agent commissions. Advertising can also cut marketing costs
by reaching consumers directly and reducing the number of needed sales
staff personnel. A number of the large real estate brokerage and mortgage
origination companies are advertising extensively, including national print
and television advertising. Sears includes mortgage advertising in its store
catalogs and has developed the first brand name mortgage loan, the Sears
Home Mortgage, as a further effort at direct consumer appeal.
As is readily apparent, changes among firms and groupings of firms
engaged in land transfer servicing have been substantial, even dramatic,
and change patterns are likely to continue. Why these changes? What pres-
sures and inducements are causing such unusually acute modifications in
how these firms and groupings are structured and operated? 19 There is no
single overriding cause, but rather a variety of conditions and events are
having an influence. Three factors are of major underlying importance: vol-
atile interest rates, especially the high rates of the early 1980s; enhanced
support for deregulation, particularly at the federal level; and advances in
computer and related electronic communication technology.
These three factors have had the greatest impact on the lending group
of land transfer servicing firms and it is lending that is generally the driving
force for change throughout the land transfer process. Interest rates are the
principal determinants of lenders' charges and these charges are the pri-
mary influence on the volume of activity in the real estate market. The
cycle of real estate activity is largely a function of interest rates. Deregula-
tion, over the past decade, has acquired tremendous support as an ideology
117. McFall, supra note 108, at 69. This same study showed that about 11% of real
estate brokers were originating mortgages by computer or other means. On computer loan
origination networks, see also Anderman, CLOs, MORTGAGE BANKING, April 1985, at 79;
Guttentag, Recent Changes in the Primary Home Mortgage Market, 3 HOUSING FINANCE
REV. 221, 245 (describing the Shelternet system, affiliated with First Boston Corporation).
118. SMR RESEARCH CORPORATION, supra note 97, at 85-86.
119. On change causation in land transfer servicing operations, with special reference to
mortgage lending, see A. DowNs, supra note 66, ch. 2; Guttentag, supra note 117, at 221;
Kane, Change and Progress in Contemporary Mortgage Markets, 3 HOUSING FINANCE REV.
257 (1984); Lasko, The Future of Mortgage Banking, A Window on the World, MORTGAGE
BANKING, Dec. 1986, at 79-82; SMR RESEARCH CORPORATION, supra note 97, at 28-29.
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and political agenda item, support that has produced substantial lessening
of government controls over a number of segments of the economy. Most
notably in the real estate lending field, moderation of controls over thrifts in
efforts to save them financially has had a pronounced ripple effect through-
out land transfer servicing. Important bank decontrol steps also have been
taken, with more expected. Computer systems, in their vast storage capac-
ity, rapid retrieval, easy document preparation, and extensive information
networking over widely separated geographic locations have made possible
many recent improvements in land transfer servicing. Transaction volume,
speed, and accuracy are increased, and often at lower cost. In mortgage
lending, computer systems are essential to some of the new marketing tech-
niques, the increased efficiency of contemporary large scale mortgage origi-
nation and servicing, and operation of the modern secondary mortgage
market.12
0
Computer systems also are being extensively utilized by title insurance
companies for title plant maintenance, title searches, and policy prepara-
tion.12 1 One reason that companies with large title plants are automating
them is that it avoids the difficult personnel problem of finding enough
qualified staff willing to perform the dull, tedious work required in main-
taining manual plants and making searches in them. It also makes joint
title plant usage by different companies more feasible by enabling plant
access from different sites. Further, the percentage of errors by company
personnel in maintaining and utilizing plants is less with automated than
manual plants.
The giant companies that recently have entered the land transfer ser-
vice field have no doubt taken the above three factors into consideration in
making their moves. They also appear to have been influenced by the tre-
mendous size of the markets, involving billions of dollars in transactions
annually, with good profit prospects for those firms that can acquire a con-
siderable proportion of one or more of these markets. Given the fragmented
character of land transfer service markets and the tremendous resources of
the big companies available for acquisition and expansion, the opportunities
for acquiring favorable market shares have varied from good to assured.
Possibilities for vertical integration, cross-selling, more aggressive market-
ing, and organizational streamlining seem to have increased still further the
attractions of major moves into land transfer servicing. After all, big busi-
ness is supposed to be adept at planning and carrying out efforts of these
kinds. To companies such as General Motors and Sears, whose core busi-
nesses have been faced with stabilization or decline, land transfer servicing
120. The importance of computer systems to the secondary mortgage market is dis-
cussed in Merrill Lynch's Richard Pratt Discusses the Secondary Mortgage Market, TR. &
EST., Feb. 1984, at 15.
121. On title company automation, see supra note 39.
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also offers an attractive hedge, and one with little or no likelihood of serious
foreign competition that has proven so troublesome to the automobile
companies.
The recent entry, integration, and expansion moves of big corporations
in land transfer servicing have met little resistance from government regula-
tors and little in the way of new laws seeking to block or roll back these
moves. Opposition to interstate banking and nonbank banks is an exception
to the general lack of resistance to expansion moves of big corporations in
land transfer servicing.12 As expected, the firms have structured their ac-
tivities so as to avoid most threats from existing antitrust, conflict of inter-
est, business preserve protection, and other laws that could cause them diffi-
culties. Furthermore, the pro-free market, deregulatory mood of the times
has been receptive to the market shakeups and business innovations that the
big firms have attempted, especially when promising greater operational ef-
ficiency. It remains to be seen if the regulatory environment in land transfer
servicing will remain as favorable to aggressive expansionary moves of big
corporations, particularly if the companies keep reaching out in new direc-
tions, individual firms acquire very large market shares, or there is a severe
slowdown in real estate activity that causes a general recession in real es-
tate transfer servicing.
Although big companies have moved heavily into land transfer servic-
ing, there is no certainty that they will all remain in the field. Divestment of
company segments that have proven disappointing or seem necessary to sell
off in order to protect against or pay for takeovers are commonplace in
contemporary American business. Successful segments may even be availa-
ble for sale if the seller thinks the sale price realized can earn more in a
different venture. Large conglomerates are particularly prone to look at op-
erational business units as massive commodities subject to sale as well as
purchase if it makes good economic sense to follow this course. A few of the
big new entrants into land transfer servicing already have sold some or all
of their land transfer servicing units.12 s Additional divestments can be ex-
122. The banks have also faced stiff opposition in their efforts to shore up their weak-
ened profit position by such means as greatly expanding their legal authorization to underwrite
securities. Much of this controversy has centered on attempts to repeal the Glass-Steagall Act.
123. A widely publicized divestment transaction was Merrill Lynch's recent disposal of
Merrill Lynch Realty through a public offering after a deal to sell this unit to a corporate
buyer for a reported half-billion dollars or more fell through. Other relevant recent divestment
examples are Lincoln National's sale of Chicago Title to Allegheny Corporation, Southern
Pacific's sale of its substantial interest in Ticor Title Insurance, and a sale by Sears to Citicorp
of fifty savings and loan branches. Some divestments apparently are the result of disappoint-
ment in earnings potential from what the corporate parents anticipated at the time of acquisi-
tion. As one of our informants stated during the course of an interviev : "Buying a company in
a business you previously have had no experience with is much like having your first child. You
do not fully appreciate what all the problems will be until after the child arrives."
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pected over the next few years or so.
In the above consideration of new developments among land transfer
servicers, one servicing group - private law firms - is noticeably absent.
The explanation for this is simple. In their scope and structure of operations
these firms in their land transfer servicing work have not changed substan-
tially in recent years. They have continued to lose some land transfer work
to competitors: closing work to lenders, brokers, escrow agents, and title
companies; some bank work to emerging in-house bank corporate law de-
partments; and some deal making and mortgage securities' work to in-house
staffs of investment banks. But generally, their land transfer roles have re-
mained much the same. New legal problems have arisen to be dealt with
and new legal instruments have been created to meet current demands, but
this kind of novelty is standard lawyers' fare. Nor have private law firms in
their land transfer work structurally changed much. The big law firms are
growing but remain miniscule compared to the big corporations now active
in land transfer servicing. Furthermore, real estate matters generally consti-
tute a minor share of big law firm workload. Client representation in real
estate transactions remains largely in the hands of smaller firms operating
much as they have in the past.
III. DEFICIENCIES
Any major servicing process, and certainly any as massive and complex
as land transfer servicing, is bound to have deficiencies. The land transfer
servicing process discloses deficiencies in both services provided and in those
firms and groups of firms offering services, the latter being crucial determi-
nants of the former. With few exceptions, deficiencies are concentrated in
segments of the process rather than being universal to all stages and types
of providers, but the process has so many internal linkages that a deficiency
in one segment can have an effect on others. As to what constitutes a defi-
ciency or how serious a particular shortcoming may be, land transfer ser-
vicers may not always agree. The vantage point of the observer, including
the observer's self-interest, can influence how a situation is viewed and how
undesirable its consequences are. Nevertheless, widely shared perceptions
do exist as to what are deficiencies in the process. Some of the more signifi-
cant of these deficiencies are briefly summarized below.
Cyclical volume. Many businesses are subject to cyclical activity but
businesses closely tied to real estate markets, including most particularly
the servicing of real estate transfer transactions, are acutely affected by
such activity. The real estate activity cycle, largely a function of interest
rates, moves up and down over what can be relatively short but unpredict-
able periods, the upward or downward phase often lasting for only three or
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four years.1 24 High mortgage interest rates slow the volume of transactions,
often drastically so, as during the early 1980s when interest rates on home
mortgages peaked at over sixteen percent.1 25 High interest rates deter real
estate sales by substantially increasing financing costs and the amount that
buyers must pay in monthly or other installment payments. Low volume
can, of course, have serious negative consequences on the profits of land
transfer servicers, although some considerably more than others. Not only
can declines reduce or eliminate profits, but prolonged declines often neces-
sitate personnel layoffs, and when volume revives it can be difficult to
restaff with qualified personnel as rapidly as needed.
Title companies, mortgage banks, and thrifts suffer severely by sharp
downward moves in the real estate cycle; lawyers and brokers may be less
adversely affected. Lawyers are highly flexible in the work they can per-
form, so that when the real estate market is in protracted decline, many
lawyers who specialize in land transfer servicing shift to handling other
kinds of legal problems. Of course, too, lawyers' mortgage foreclosure prac-
tices are likely to expand in these periods of market decline. Most real es-
tate brokerage firms are aided in riding out low periods in the real estate
cycle because their sales personnel consist heavily of part-timers on com-
mission, many of whom have ancillary sources of income or support. If
these salespeople make no sales, the firms they are affiliated with need not
pay them. Yet when the market comes alive again, most of these salespe-
ople are readily available to assume a more active sales role.
Prices charged and services provided. It is at least arguable that some
land transfer service prices charged consumers are higher than they should
be.126 Real estate brokers' commissions 27 and lawyers' fees are both vulner-
able to this criticism; and title insurance rates, despite the modest profit-
ability record of title insurance underwriting, could be reduced somewhat
with more intense competition. Further, it has been claimed that title insur-
ance rates fail adequately to reflect variations in risk and title evaluation
costs among different categories of insureds.128 Title insurers also have been
faulted for price discrimination, charging different prices for substantially
124. Housing starts move in similar cycles. An Urban Institute study determined that
between 1950 and 1980 there were six major housing start cycles. J. TUCCILLO, supra note 66,
at 17-19.
125. In 1981, average home mortgage rates in the United States slightly exceeded 16%.
STATISTICAL ABSTRACT, supra note 63, at 493, table 833.
126. An astute analysis of land transfer servicing costs, with an interesting statutory
proposal, appears in Whitman, Home Transfer Costs: An Economic and Legal Analysis, 62
GEO. L.J. 1311 (1974).
127. For an attack on real estate brokerage commissions as exorbitant, see Grigsby,
Residential Brokerage Costs Are Too High, REAL EST. REV., Summer 1984, at 109.
128. E.g., Uri, supra note 48, at 93-94. But see the response to Uri in Christie, supra
note 58.
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the same service.' 29 Also, more efficient integration of steps in the housing
finance transaction process could reduce the overall cost of financing a
home, one eminent authority claims by as much as an entire percentage
point.1 30 Increased efficiencies at any other point in the transfer servicing
process, if savings were passed back to consumers, could also have an effect
in cutting or holding down prices.
A problem has developed in title insurance, worrisome to insurers, that
is exerting price increase pressures on title insurance coverage. This prob-
lem is a drift toward higher loss ratios that a number of firms are exper-
iencing. 3' Title insurance, which has been a low loss form of essentially
noncasualty insurance, now is faced with policy losses as a more significant
expense item. A variety of reasons have been advanced for this increased
loss trend, including inexperienced and dishonest agents; carelessness in ti-
tle plant postings; negligent title searches and examinations; inadequate ef-
forts at quality control by the insurers; and a tendency for some companies,
pushed by competition including lenders' demands, to take greater chances
in the coverage they provide.
Doubts, too, can be raised as to the quality of some land transfer ser-
vices, especially those provided home buyers. Home buyers are usually in
need of full and accurate outside advice about how the transfer process
functions and what the merits and demerits are of the properties they con-
template purchasing, as their background knowledge ordinarily is skimpy or
nonexistent. Many real estate agents are not sufficiently competent to per-
form this function as well as they should. Inadequate home buyer counsel-
ing on mortgage loans also can be a problem. The possibility of inadequate
counseling is enhanced by the new electronic marketing schemes in which
originations are arranged from real estate brokerage offices hooked up by
computer with distant lenders. Greater efficiency of electronic communica-
tions can have serious quality costs. An added quality problem concerns
residential land sale contracts. These contracts, if prepared by real estate
brokers, as is often the case, frequently are inadequately tailored to the
special needs of buyers or sellers or both. The same can be true of deeds
and other conveyancing instruments prepared by brokers. Unauthorized
practice cases brought against real estate brokers no doubt are prompted
principally by lawyers' interests in preserving their conveyancing monopoly,
such as it is. However, risks of inadequate and even seriously flawed instru-
ments apparently are greater when drafting or form selection and comple-
tion are by brokers rather than lawyers. Delays in performing service work
129. Owen, supra note 48, at 941.
130. Downs, supra note 69, at 37.
131. This problem is discussed in AMERICAN LAND TITLE Ass'N, TITLE INSURANCE IN-
DUSTRY STATISTICS 23-24 (1984); Little, ElIjenholm, Burke, Pahl & Pollay, Claims - A Crisis
- What We Can Do About It, TITLE NEWS, June-July 1983, at 7.
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can be a troublesome service deficiency too. Delays can be damaging and
very disconcerting to land buyers and sellers, and lenders and lawyers are
too often dilatory in their processing of land transaction work such as lend-
ers in passing on loan applications, and lawyers in contract of sale prepara-
tion and in performing requisite settlement procedures.13 2 Delays are usu-
ally most serious in peak periods of real estate activity, a good example
being the surge of refinancings in 1986 that accompanied a sharp drop in
real estate mortgage rates.
Another asserted real estate broker deficiency is that consumers are
not offered enough variation in service packages. In particular, sellers can-
not have their properties listed or buyers receive available listing data with-
out advice, negotiation assistance, referral recommendations, and document
preparation, even if they do not wish these added services.1 33 In essence,
this demand for less than full-service brokerage is a pricing complaint.
What some critics quite properly want is an option, readily available to
buyers and sellers, that for a price substantially below prevailing broker
commissions, at least some brokers will act merely as information ex-
changes of what sellers are offering and buyers might be intersted in ac-
quiring. The information presumably would be more detailed than what
typically appears in newspaper advertisements but responsibility for making
further contacts, arranging site visits and open-houses, aiding in the negoti-
ation of counter-offers, and working out contract terms would be up to the
parties without further broker assistance.
Conflict of interest. Conflict of interest is inherent in many land trans-
fer servicing situations and involves problems of choice facing servicers.
These problems can entail the pull of diverse loyalties to different outsiders
or the more common conflict between servicers' self-interests and the inter-
ests of others, such as service consumers. Real estate brokers frequently are
involved in conflict of interest situations concerning diverse interests of out-
siders. They seek to effectuate sales by appealing to and adjusting the inter-
ests of buyers and sellers, interests that in important respects are often in-
consistent. Although legally representing the seller in most cases, individual
brokers often tend to behave as representatives of both the buyer and the
seller, particularly in non-multiple listing service transactions. The loyalty
choice difficulties in such a situation are clear and the problem can be most
acute when a typically uninformed residential buyer and seller are involved,
persons likely to be unaware of the risks or how to deal with them. Lawyers
132. For lawyers' complaints that lenders are imposing unreasonable time and documen-
tation demands on lawyers handling closings because of either pressures from the secondary
market for mortgages or because lenders hope to avoid loan commitments made prior to a
market increase in interest rates, see White, A Simple Closing No Longer, CONN. L. TRIB.,
June 8, 1987, at 1.
133. Erxleben, supra note 3, at 208-11.
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also can become involved in a similar conflict of interest dilemma when
representing both the buyer and seller.""
More pervasive and often more subtle are the conflict problems that
can arise when interests of the service provider and consumer conflict. An
example is the conflict that can develop over the real estate broker's com-
mission prospects. Should, for instance, the broker seek to influence the
seller to accept an offer at a lower price, with an assured commission to the
broker, rather than recommend that the seller seek a more tenuous sale
prospect at a considerably higher price, with the chance that the broker will
effectuate no sale and earn no commission? In this situation, a broker can
be torn between what is best for the seller and what is best for the broker,
and the seller who relies heavily on the broker's advice may be at risk that
the broker's interest will predominate in resolving the issue. Lawyers can
encounter similar ethical problems, including those resulting from referrals
by mortgage lenders, frequent referral sources for many lawyers. Should a
lawyer, for example, who represents a borrower referred to the lawyer by
the lender, favor the referring lender over the borrower when a conflict of
interest between the lender and borrower arises? Should the lawyer favor
the lender out of concern that otherwise further referrals from the lender
will not be forthcoming? The answer to the ethical problem posed is clear,
but clients who rely on their lawyers still are at risk that the lawyers' self-
interest will be the determining factor.
Common ownership of brokers and lenders also can raise conflict of
interest issues. If a brokerage firm and lender are commonly owned and
employees of the brokerage firm channel customers to the affiliated lender
when other lenders could better accommodate the customers' needs, there is
a strong likelihood that the referrers are consciously preferring the em-
ployer's interests to those of the customers. The conflict of interest is re-
solved against the customers. Integration of diverse land transfer services in
the same firm can similarly lead to conflict of interest risks to customers."3
Restrictions on competition. To those strongly favoring free markets
and open competition, land transfer servicing can be seen as subject to more
restraints on competition than is justifiable. Many of these restrictions are
imposed by laws pertaining to entry into the servicing field, the range of
services that some kinds of firms may offer, and price and other restraints
on servicing operations. There also are practices engaged in by servicers
that restrict competition or evidence such restriction, some of dubious legal-
134. Directives on permissible lawyer behavior in conflict of interest situations include
MODEL RULES, supra note 15, Rule 1.7, and MODEL CODE, supra note 15, DR5-105. See also
supra note 17 and accompanying text.
135. For a discussion of conflict of interest risks if bank activities are diversified, see R.
LITAN, supra note 92, at 135-43.
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ity, others not. One such practice is the previously discussed widespread
adherence of real estate brokers to the same commission charge over long
periods of time. Although there obviously is substantial competition among
real estate brokers for listings and in making sales, consistency of commis-
sion charges in individual trading areas indicates lack of competition on the
matter of price. 3 6 It is claimed, too, that the way multiple listing services
are administered has contributed to brokers' commission rigidity as well as
to standardization of their services and the usual practice of offering only
full-service brokerage.13 7 The MLS structure is well-suited to collusive price
setting and to ostracizing brokers unwilling to cooperate with cartel-like
arrangements. Title insurance rates also tend to be stable and noncompeti-
tive" s8 but to a considerable extent legally so, due to the insurance antitrust
exemption under the McCarran-Ferguson Act."3 9 In most states, however,
lack of close insurance commission attention to premium rates has enabled
insurers collectively to exert extensive control over rate fixing, although less
over the search and examination charge than over the risk component.
Another practice that allegedly restricts competition is the referral of
customers to a servicer when there is an ownership tie between referrer and
servicer, for example, when one is owned in whole or in part by the other.
The argument is that this so-called controlled business situation reduces
competition by effectively eliminating other servicers from competing for
the referred work, as generally the referrer will channel the work to its
commonly owned affiliate. Lessened competition, it is then argued, ad-
versely affects the price or quality of what consumers receive. This reduced
competition also, of course, can seriously harm other servicers or their
agents by cutting their market share. In addition, as has been seen, it can
raise conflict of interest problems. Controlled business has been particularly
controversial in the title insurance field, most notably when real estate bro-
kers, lenders, or title insurance underwriters buy into or open title insurance
agencies. " The brokers and lenders then channel customers to the agencies
136. The pricing of residential real estate brokers' services is discussed in Erxleben,
supra note 3; Phillips & Butler, supra note 8, at 637-40; Yinger, A Search Model of Real
Estate Broker Behavior, 71 AM. EcoN. REV. 591 (1981). Phillips and Butler assert that in
Texas the prevailing six percent commission rate charged by residential brokers belonging to
real estate boards is resulting in these brokers losing some market share to homeowners who
are selling on their own or to licensed brokers, not realty board or MLS members, who may be
cutting commissions. Phillips & Butler, supra, at 642-44.
137. Erxleben, supra note 3, at 191-92, 208. However, Erxleben considers the MLS
device so valuable in increasing efficiency of the real estate sales market that it should not be
eliminated, although in need of reform. Id. at 192.
138. Owen, supra note 48, at 939-41.
139. See supra notes 57-59 and accompanying text.
140. On controlled business as it relates to title insurance, see Kennedy, Morrow, Toft
& Woodward, New Boys on the Block - A Look At Our Industry From Inside and Out,
TITLE NEWS, Jan. 1983, at 23, 27; Maher, Day, Plotkin & Little, The Evils of Controlled
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they own and the underwriters' agencies channel customers to their parent
underwriter. This channeling, it is asserted, has negative price and quality
consequences for consumers, the insureds.'" Enough opposition to con-
trolled business developed, particularly from title insurers, so that in 1983
the Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act was amended to apply expressly
to controlled business and bar some referrals of real estate settlement ser-
vice work if the referrer has more than a one percent ownership interest in
the entity to which the referral is being made. 42 The amendment is less
restrictive than what many title insurers wanted and through disclosures
and other exceptions is largely innocuous.
To some, controlled business is seen as a form of unproductive vertical
integration, the exercise of market power without redeeming social value.' 43
However, these attacks are based more on rhetoric than proof of antisocial
Business, TITLE NEWS, Jan. 1980, at 59; Plotkin, The Economic Consequences of Controlled
Business, TITLE NEWS, Dec. 1981, at 8 [hereinafter Plotkin, Economic Consequences].
Those concerned with title insurance are not in full accord as to what is controlled busi-
ness. Consider these two definitions given at the same American Land Title Association spon-
sored panel:
[C]ontrolled business [is] defined as the compensated referral of settlement services from
one entity to another in which the referring entity has some ownership interest. The own-
ership may be a partnership interest or stock arrangement and the compensation may be
in the form of a partnership profit distribution or stock dividend. But the essential aspect
of this arrangement which sets it apart from the classic kickback or referral fee paid
between independent actors is the ownership or controlling interest which the referrer has
in the entity to which the referral is made. An example - one which is not uncommon
- would be the creation of a title agency, underwritten and possibly staffed by a title
insurance underwriter.
Maher, Day, Plotkin & Little, supra, at 60 (comment by Maher).
In my definition of controlled business I don't make any distinction between that which is
owned and that which is steered, as long as there is tangible reward that goes to control-
ling the placement of business. I think it has the same effect whether it's paid in a divi-
dend or a rebate or whatever.
Id. at 62 (comment by Day).
The commercial title insurers have attacked the bar-related companies on grounds, among
others, that the bar-related companies are controlled businesses. See D. BURKE, supra note 1,
at 15-16; Roussel & Rosenberg, Lawyer-Controlled Title Insurance Companies: Legal Ethics
and the Need for Insurance Department Regulation, 48 FORDHAM L. REv. 25, 28-30, 51
(1979). The American Bar Association has taken the position that a lawyer having a financial
interest in a bar-related company does not, on conflict of interest grounds, prevent the lawyer
from channeling a client's title insurance work to that company, provided full disclosure of the
interest is made to the client. ABA Comm. on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Formal
Op. 331 (1972).
141. See Plotkin, Economic Consequences, supra note 140, at 9; statement by Day in
Maher, Day, Plotkin & Little, supra note 140, at 62. Day is concerned that controlled business
increases the casualty model of writing title insurance. Id.
142. 12 U.S.C. §§ 2602, 2607 (1982 & Supp. III 1985) (as amended). The 1983
amendment is discussed in D. BURKE, supra note 1, at 254-60.
143. Plotkin, Economic Consequences, supra note 140, at 9.
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results. Since most controlled business opponents are servicers or their
agents and are threatened by the integrative use of market power, some
skepticism arises as to the validity of their arguments. Quite possibly, how-
ever, controlled business can be advantageous to some firms without any of
the benefits accruing to consumers. Title insurers generally do not compete
in the consumer market, or do not do so effectively, by direct approaches to
home buyers. " ' They are more effective in competing directly for the busi-
ness of lenders, developers, or large industrial or commercial property own-
ers, but a high percentage of title insurance policies are issued to home
buyers.
To acquire home buyer business, title underwriters must rely on refer-
rals from agents or others that have direct home buyer contacts. Controlled
business can enhance profits of some integrated operations, particularly if
the financial benefits of integration are not passed back to consumers. Com-
petition among referrers generally is not keen enough to force much sharing
of these benefits. This enhancement of profits unshared with consumers can
result not only from controlled business but also from incentive payments
by title insurers to their referrers when there is no ownership tie between
insurers and referrers.
Much of the marketing effort of title insurers is focused on referrers,
many of them lawyers and other independent agents of the insurers. These
marketing efforts are known as reverse competition, 45 a common phenome-
non in American business. Due to competitive limitations of the insurers,
they concentrate their marketing efforts on intermediaries rather than ulti-
mate consumers. If the intermediaries are not subject to sufficient competi-
tive pressure from consumers, they may pass little or none of their incentive
payments back to consumers and these incentives paid by title insurers to
agents are substantial.4 6 Profiting by title insurance agents from referrals,
except from services they provide other than recommending an insurer, is
viewed in some quarters as undesirable because it not only tends to increase
consumer prices but also to reduce insurer profits unduly. As discussed pre-
viously, 47 RESPA and some state statutes have sought to eliminate referral
fees for most referrals of land transfer servicing work by title insurance
company agents and others, but enforcement has proven difficult and exten-
sive violations presumably are 6ccurring. Eliminating such evils as may ex-
144. This lack of title insurer competition in the consumer market is discussed in Whit-
man, supra note 95.
145. On reverse competition in the title insurance field, see D. BURKE, supra note I, at
237-38; Quiner, supra note 54, at 722-23; Rooney, supra note 51, at 308-18; Roussel, Pera &
Rosenberg, supra note 51, at 643-45.
146. Phillips and Butler consider these substantial incentive payments as one reason for
the relatively poor profit performance of title insurance compared to other forms of insurance.
Phillips & Butler, supra note 8, at 660.
147. See supra note 24 and accompanying text.
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ist from controlled business and referrals can be a formidable task, as the
market on its own seems unlikely to provide corrections and more effective
government regulation will be hard to achieve.
Financial viability of major servicers. In their basic mode of operation,
the thrifts, particularly the savings and loan associations, are vulnerable to
major losses during protracted high interest periods that can so undermine
their profitability as to threaten their continued viability. 4 8 This vulnerabil-
ity is related to the cyclical volume activity considered above, but is compli-
cated by the interest rate squeeze thrifts face during high interest periods
and the involvement of federal deposit insurance programs. High interest
rates of the early 1980s were catastrophic for the thrifts as a group. In
1980 and 1981 alone, the thrift industry lost 750 institutions, fifteen percent
of their total number, and from 1980 to 1982, the industry lost about half
its net worth.' 9
Contributing to problems of the savings and loans were accounting
procedures approved by federal regulatory agencies that tended to conceal
financial difficulties and far too prevalent poor quality loans. Even after in-
terest rates receded markedly, many savings and loans remained in shaky
condition. There is concern that with the next sharp rise in interest rates,
the thrifts will again go into depression, with generalized losses and many
new casualties, especially among savings and loans. This situation has tre-
mendous significance for the mortgage market, as thrifts are by far the
largest originators of home mortgages and most thrifts retain a high per-
centage of the mortgages they originate. If the thrifts' participation in the
home mortgage market is drastically reduced, will other institutions as sat-
isfactorily take over and fill the gap? Relevant to this question is will and
should the federal government continue to provide deposit insurance to
thrift depositors, a backup that has enabled many thrifts to stay in business
during difficult high interest periods? And if this insurance is to be contin-
ued, will and should its premium terms be modified?
The underlying problem of the thrifts, simply stated, is that they lend
long and borrow short. Their mortgage loans usually are for periods of ten
years or more, whereas the money they loan comes principally from funds
that they in effect are borrowing from their depositors on a short term or
148. On the financial problems of the thrifts, see A. DowNs, supra note 66, at 175-215,
303-05; Downs, supra note 69, at 30-37; The Thrift Industry at the Crossroads: A Panel
Discussion, 3 ANN. REV. OF BANKING LAW 149 (1984). Severe regional recession has accen-
tuated the thrifts' problems in some states, Texas in particular, where speculative lending prac-
tices and inadequate monitoring have further contributed to the insolvency of many thrifts.
Apcar, Texas S&L Disasters Are Blamed in Part on Freewheeling Style, Wall St. J., July 13,
1987, at 1, col. 6.
149. Gray, The Role of Regulation in the Thrift Industry, 6 ANN. REV. BANKING LAW
235, 238 (1987).
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demand return basis. In high interest periods, the thrifts must pay high
interest rates or depositors will withdraw their moneys. Disintermediation,
withdrawal, and investment elsewhere, are the less than helpful descriptive
terms for what occurs if depositors are not offered high enough rates. Ex-
tensive disintermediation can lead to insolvency of the thrifts experiencing
large withdrawals. However, if high enough interest rates are offered to
prevent withdrawals, the thrifts may have difficulty paying the higher rates
because of the low interest that they are receiving on their long-term mort-
gage loans.
One way that some thrifts have dealt with this profit squeeze situation
is to make many new mortgage loans at very high rates. To do so they may
have to make riskier loans and, as well, may need to pay more to depositors
as incentives of one sort or another to attract sufficient loan moneys. Such
loan expansion programs can be very precarious to the thrifts, particularly
if sharp interest rate declines do not soon occur. But depositors, even if
knowledgeable about the thrifts' precarious strategy, are unlikely to become
apprehensive and withdraw, as their deposits are federally insured. Thus,
the federal deposit insurance program has encouraged speculative behavior
by some thrifts that has contributed greatly to the heavy losses that the
insurance program has suffered, losses that federal taxpayers may ulti-
mately be required to help pay for.
Legal responses in the early 1980s to the thrifts' profit-squeeze prob-
lem included deposit rate deregulation, authorization for the thrifts to
broaden substantially the range of shorter-term non-real estate loans they
could make, and providing means for thrifts to unload some of their unfa-
vorable long-term loans. The previously discussed Garn-St.Germaine Act
was the principal source of these significant deregulatory moves aimed at
increasing the thrifts' loanable funds and decreasing their loan maturities.
Following passage of the Garn-St.Germaine Act, thrift deposits expanded
dramatically, but many thrifts allocated this flow of funds into an excessive
percentage of risky loans and risky equity investments. The federal authori-
ties responded to these developments with a measure of reregulation, in-
cluding increased thrift capital requirements' 5" and limitations on direct eq-
uity investment,1 51 with this latter type investment feared by many
regulators as potentially more risky than mortgage loans. 52
It has been hoped that this mix of deregulation and reregulation would
bring the thrifts to long-run profitability and eliminate the insolvency risk
150. 12 C.F.R. § 563.13 (1987).
151. 12 C.F.R. § 563.9-8 (1987).
152. On reregulation by the Federal Home Loan Bank Board, see Gray, supra note 149,
at 240-42; Litan, Evaluating and Controlling the Risks of Financial Product Deregulation, 3
YALE J. ON REG. 1, 29-31 (1985).
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faced by the Federal Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation, the federal
agency that insures savings and loan deposits. It has also been hoped that
thrifts moving heavily into adjustable rate mortgages, a loan form that
greatly reduces risks from escalating market rates of interest, and operating
more like mortgage banks by originating mortgages increasingly for re-
sale' 53 would further strengthen the thrifts and the FSLIC. However, it
seems doubtful that the thrifts have changed sufficiently to remove the pros-
pect of even more serious thrift losses and a much greater insolvency rate
the next time there is another protracted period in which short-term interest
rates remain considerably above the long-term interest rates on large
amounts of real estate mortgage debt outstanding. 5 4 The current situation
also remains grave, with nearly twenty percent of the savings and loan in-
dustry reputedly insolvent. Congress recently passed the Competitive Equal-
ity Banking Act of 1987 that made available to the FSLIC 10.8 billion
dollars in desparately needed new funds.155 However, even this sizable
bailout apparently will be inadequate to pay all upcoming insured depositor
losses.' 5
Private mortgage insurers are another type of enterprise significant to
the land transfer process whose financial viability has caused concern. In-
surance of this sort was not written by private companies following the de-
pression of the 1930s until 1957'1 7 but is now a common form of coverage
and of particular importance to acceptability of many residential mortgages
in the secondary market. For some years after private companies again en-
tered the mortgage insurance market, this type of coverage was profitable
but losses later mounted and several companies have recently failed, includ-
ing one of the largest. The serious loss situation that developed has been
attributed to declining home prices in overbuilt areas such as Texas, unreli-
able appraisals, inadequate premiums, and adjustable rate mortgages lead-
153. Thrifts are moving more toward the mortgage banking role of originating for sale.
In 1986, thrift originations were up 35% over 1985 but loan sales in 1986 of $169 billion were
up 79% over 1986. For an analysis of this originate and sell role see Rosen, Youngblood,
Hustick, Hopkins & Stepan, Housing and Mortgage Market Review, 6 HOUSING FIN. REV.
41, 67-69 (1987).
154. For amplification of this view, see A. DOWNS, supra note 66, at 304-05. For a
study that also casts doubt on the new service options available to savings and loans as means
of decreasing the risks faced by these institutions, see Joffrion & Rose, Savings and Loans'
Response to Deregulation: Evidence from Multivariate Models and a National Survey, 6
HOUSING FIN. REV. 17 (1987).
155. On this act see supra note 90.
156. Isaac, A Better Way to Save the Thrifts, N.Y. Times, July 31, 1987, at A31, col.
1.
157. Mortgage insurance by private underwriters proved disasterous during the 1930s
and caused the insolvency of a number of title insurers that also were writing mortgage insur-
ance. On these financial disasters see D. GAGE, LAND TITLE ASSURING AGENCIES IN THE
UNITED STATES 118-19 (1937); Pope, supra note 86, at 19-20.
[Vol. 22
Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 22, No. 3 [1988], Art. 1
https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol22/iss3/1
LAND TRANSFERS
ing to defaults when interest rates are increased. 5 8 The insurers are taking
steps to reduce their losses,' 69 but mortgage insurance remains an inher-
ently risky type of venture.
Land title record keeping systems. These land title record keeping sys-
tems in the United States are inefficient in two significant respects as they
affect land transfer servicing. The public records, especially in most larger
urban counties, are too complicated and labor intensive to use efficiently for
land title searches; and where private title plants exist, there is extensive
duplication of public and private records. The private plants facilitate the
title search process sufficiently to justify the expense of creating and main-
taining them, provided that they are used for an adequate volume of
searches. Title companies that own and operate the plants have a steady
high volume flow of searches. If the public records were more efficiently
organized, the private plants would be unnecessary. The inefficiencies in
American land title record keeping systems have an appreciable effect in
increasing land transfer costs to most consumers of such services.
Massive size of some servicing firms. There has been a long history in
the United States of apprehension over the sheer bigness of big business
and a distrust and fear of enormous corporations because of their size.
There is concern that mammoth corporations, including the great conglom-
erates, tend to create monopolies and that through reciprocal dealing, cross-
subsidizing, and mutual forbearing, economic control shifts from the mar-
ket to the big corporations. Diversity of goods and services sold by any one
megagiant can accentuate these adverse effects by more markets being in-
vaded. Corporate bigness not only raises concerns about monopoly risks but
also apprehensions as to the political consequences of such economic con-
centration. Are the corporate megagiants, with the tremendous political in-
fluence they exert, antithetical to a democratic order? This certainly is a
question that merits being raised. Although the prevailing view today ap-
pears to be that corporate bigness qua bigness is not necessarily an evil, 60
there are contemporary economists, among others, who disagree.8 1 Given
the increasing number of very large corporations now engaged in land
transfer servicing, corporate size becomes a relevant issue and massive size
an arguable deficiency in considerations of this type of servicing.
158. See Pollack & Steinbach, supra note 86.
159. Id.
160. See, e.g., Easterbrook, Workable Antitrust Policy, 84 MICH. L. REV. 1696 (1986);
Fischel, Rosenfield & Stillman, supra note 89, at 333.
161. See, e.g., Dugger, The Shortcomings of Concentration Ratios in the Conglomerate
Age: New Sources and Uses of Corporate Power, 19 J. ECON. ISSUES 343 (1985); Gruchy,
Corporate Concentration and the Restructuring of the American Economy, 19 J. ECON. IS-
SUES 429 (1985). See also C. LINDBLOM, POLITICS AND MARKETS, 161-233, 356 (1977); Ad-
ams, Public Policy in a Free Enterprise Economy, in THE STRUCTURE OF AMERICAN INDUS-
TRY 475 (W. Adams 6th ed. 1982).
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IV. ADAPTING TO THE FUTURE
Many aspects of land transfer servicing are likely to remain much the
same for a long time into the future, although further fundamental changes
in the servicers seem probable. The volume of real estate sales and mort-
gage transactions will remain high and mortgage debt outstanding will be a
major form of domestic debt and investment opportunity. It is obvious that
there will continue to be a massive market in land and its improvements
and that most land sales will be financed by some form of mortgage or
comparable secured loan, the loans relatively long-term with principal am-
ortized. The market in land and hence the market for land services will
remain cyclical, with interest rates determining in large part the movement
of the cycle."' 5 This means that most land servicers must adjust to periodic
shifts in business volume, some of which may be sharply up or sharply
down, with consequent implications for profitability. Submarkets for various
types of land parcels will persist, with many servicers specializing by type of
market, and single family residences being the largest submarket. A high
percentage of buyers and sellers will, as at present, lack knowledge and
information about land markets and land transfer service procedures, the
incidence of ignorance being especially high among persons buying or sell-
ing their own homes.
The importance of the secondary mortgage market will continue to in-
fluence the primary market, including the terms of mortgages being
originated, their standardization, and the practice of insuring mortgages.
These are features of mortgages that can contribute to making mortgage
debt instruments more fungible and thus more attractive to secondary mar-
ket buyers, even though backed by unique and often highly diverse land
parcels. Still another relative constant in land transfer servicing that can be
expected to remain is the consumer need for a variety of services from out-
siders, including the bringing together of buyers and sellers, advising them
on transaction merits and transfer procedures, legal document preparation,
title evaluation and protection, financing, specialist referrals, transaction co-
ordination, and closing. This is not a field in which a great increase in con-
sumer self-help is to be expected.
Along with these comparatively stable aspects of land transfer servic-
ing are other relevant factors bearing on servicing that appear likely to
change considerably. For example, it seems that a growing and unsolved
federal deficit and debt problem will increasingly drain funds away from
mortgage and other private capital markets, threatening ever-more-serious
limitations on these markets and threatening to help push interest rates to
162. On the change in Federal Reserve Board policy, as of 1979, away from attempting
to smooth out short-run business cycles by stimulating the economy toward long-run inflation
control by limiting growth in the money supply, see A. DowNs, supra note 66, at 37-39.
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unprecedented heights at the top of interest rate cycles. Also, the secondary
market, aided tremendously by increasingly varied types of mortgage-
backed securities, probably will become even more important nationally and
even internationally as the means of attracting available funds into the fi-
nancing of American real estate. Further, the owner-occupied home market
may decline relative to the rental market as rising home prices result in a
growing percentage of Americans being permanently priced out of home
ownership. A possible consequence of this could be, despite large federal
budget deficits, massive new federal government subsidies of home purchas-
ers intending owner occupancy.
But of particularly direct and crucial importance to the land transfer
servicing process are the drastic changes that can be expected in how the
servicers themselves are organized and operated. The restructuring now un-
derway is certain to be projected into the future, with a great deal of doubt
as to outcome. Presently unanswerable are questions such as: the extent to
which land transfer services will be integrated in individual firms; the range
of outside businesses that major land transfer servicers will be engaged in;
the extent to which the nation's largest corporations will seek to enter the
land transfer servicing field and which of the big corporations that recently
entered will remain; whether private law firms will be increasingly unable
or uninclined to compete in the restructured setting; and what the response
will be if it appears that one or a few corporations are capturing a very high
percentage of the market for particular land transfer services nationally,
regionally, or in major local areas. Relative to secondary market institu-
tions, there are doubts as to how extensively the federally chartered agen-
cies will be changed and what the market consequences will be if these
agencies are drastically modified or eliminated. Powerful political forces
favor phasing out GNMA and making FNMA and FHLMC fully private
bodies.1 3
Many factors will influence how land transfer servicers will evolve, fac-
tors as varied as economies of scale possible in different forms of operation,
the aggressiveness and ingenuity of management, and the progress made in
electronic data storage and communication technology. However, one factor
will be of paramount significance: the nature and extent of change in gov-
ernment intervention, most notably government regulation. Additionally,
such change usually requires new or revised laws. Land transfer servicers
are sufficiently controlled by law that most major restructuring efforts will
necessitate legal change, with legislatures the principal instrumentalities of
legal change. Even moves toward less government intervention through de-
regulation or reduced or abandoned subsidies or operational supports will
163. Possible changes in these agencies are considered in A. DowNs, supra note 66, ch.
13; J. TUCCILLO, supra note 66, at 58-67; Maxwell, Go Private: Fannie May?, MORTGAGE
BANKING, June 1987, at 51.
1988]
Johnstone: Land Transfers:  Process and Processors
Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 1988
548 VALPARAISO UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 22
normally necessitate legislative action.
Existing laws controlling land transfer servicers reflect a variety of not
always consistent government policies, among the more important of which
are: protecting consumers, especially such consumers as home buyers and
sellers; protecting depositors in thrifts and commercial banks, and insureds;
protecting the economy generally by reducing risks of insolvency by major
financial institutions; preventing collusive economic behavior that weakens
competition and encourages inefficiencies; eliminating dysfunctional re-
straints on free market operations; assuring an adequate flow of funds into
real estate markets, particularly into housing; and reducing government
subsidies and operational costs.
Another common policy, often hidden behind some more idealistic ob-
jective, is favoring a politically powerful business or geographic area. Most
individual laws pertaining to land transfer servicers expressly or impliedly
seek to foster one or more of these policies. In the future, each of these
policies will continue to have some influence, but priority shifts among poli-
cies will occur in the usual law making process of balancing and compro-
mising demands and goals. For example, relative to land transfer servicing,
it seems certain that protection of consumers will remain a very high
priority.
Furthermore, there is considerable likelihood that before long the pol-
icy of deregulation to achieve a more open market will be given a lower
priority. Whether declared or undeclared, the policy of aiding a particular
business or geographic area, irrespective of the merits, will continue to be a
persistent feature of legal change pertaining to land transfer servicers as it
is in revisions of other fields of law.
Over time, the deficiencies considered in Section III should be and fre-
quently will be of concern to those seeking to restructure land transfer ser-
vicing. All of the deficiencies there discussed have existed in the past and
will continue into the future. Some, including conflict of interest and cycli-
cal volume, are inherent in land transfer servicing and can be mitigated but
not eliminated. Extensive attention is presently being focused on others,
with resulting prospects of major law reform efforts to ease problems the
deficiencies create.
Financial viability of the thrifts is illustrative of the latter. The thrifts'
financial troubles and the related problem of federal deposit insurance sol-
vency are issues of widespread concern today that have resulted in some
legislative action and more may be forthcoming soon. When a deficiency is
in the spotlight of attention, possibilities of important law reform or en-
forcement action to deal with it are considerably enhanced. Issue attention
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tends to come and go,' but when attention is high, legal action is much
more probable. Without the requisite attention, it may be difficult or impos-
sible to prod legislatures, administrative agencies, or litigants into action or
the action they take may be ineffectual. The Real Estate Settlement Proce-
dures Act of 1974 is an example of a major piece of comprehensive legisla-
tion in the land transfer servicing field that largely failed because of insuffi-
cient popular and legislative concern over the problems the Act sought to
deal with. Partial repeal seriously weakening the original Act was the
result. 165
Leaving aside the question of when is an appropriate time to push for
adoption of any particular change proposal, some suggestions of needed
changes bearing on land transfer servicing that deserve serious considera-
tion are briefly outlined below. Space is not available to develop these pro-
posals more fully here or add to their number, but the ones covered indicate
some of the possibilities for dealing with the deficiencies considered in Sec-
tion III.
1. Both the conflict of interest and uniform pricing features of
real estate brokerage need attention. One rather simple means of easing the
conflict of interest problem would be to make selling brokers in multiple
listing service situations legally the agents of buyers, with the selling bro-
kers' fees or commissions set by agreement with their principals, the buyers.
Antitrust proceedings are probably the best means of dealing with uniform
pricing of real estate brokers' services. In recent years, a scattering of anti-
trust cases have been brought against real estate brokers and most have
been settled by consent orders.166 More active antitrust enforcement action
164. On fluctuations in issue attention, see Downs, Issue-Attention Cycle, in THE POLIT-
ICAL ECONOMY OF ENVIRONMENTAL CONTROL (J. Bain & W. Ilchman eds. 1972).
165. On the lack of congressional interest in controlling or making more competitive
title insurance and other settlement service prices, see Whitman, supra note 95, at 70. Dean
Whitman's views are particularly significant because as a former HUD staff member he was a
significant figure in developing legislative proposals for controlling settlement service prices,
including some provisions of what eventually became RESPA.
166. For a consideration of these cases, see Miller & Shedd, supra note 10, at 322-23.
Among recent consent decrees are two related proceedings in Connecticut that merit being
models for enforcement efforts in other states. The two cases are Mehan v. National Ass'n of
Realtors, No. B74-332 (D. Conn.) (a Federal District Court class action), and Connecticut v.
National Ass'n of Realtors, No. 03226005 (Hartford-New Britain) (a Connecticut Superior
Court case). Settlements in these cases, that occurred in 1986, followed a three-year antitrust
investigation by the Connecticut Attorney General's office. The federal consent decree ordered
partial refunds of brokerage commissions to many sellers who paid six percent commissions.
The state decree broadly enjoined the national, state, and all local Connecticut real estate
boards and their multiple listing services from a broad range of price fixing activities, includ-
ing use of commission price schedules and restricting board membership or multiple listing
service participation because of pricing practices. Included in the 20-page federal injunction
order also are these two provisions pertaining to matters that have caused concern in many
states: "Defendants...shall not either unilaterally or in consent or agreement with others:
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is needed and it would probably be helpful if a greater percentage of cases
went to judgment without settlement in order to clarify more fully through
judicial opinions just what constitutes broker violations.
A deterrent to more aggressive antitrust enforcement efforts against
real estate brokers, of course, is the very considerable political power of the
brokers at both the state and federal levels. An influx of new competitors
might also help break the uniform brokerage pattern and reduce commis-
sions. Permitting commercial banks to offer real estate brokerage services,
at least for single family dwelling sales, could have a beneficial competitive
impact on commissions.
2. Most notably in routine residential real estate transactions,
private law firms in many parts of the nation have been losing out competi-
tively to other kinds of land transfer servicers. Further weakening of unau-
thorized practice of law restraints, a real possibility, would further accentu-
ate these market share losses. Law firm difficulties in this field often are
that costs are too high and volume too low. Costs can be cut if paralegals
are used more extensively by most firms in closing work. 167 Well-trained
paralegals working for law offices can competently perform almost all rou-
tine residential closing tasks, and the usual requirement that such parale-
gals may not handle final settlements in real estate transactions on their
own '68 seems competitively short-sighted. So long as the law firm is respon-
sible for the paralegal's closing work, and this includes malpractice liability,
a good argument can be made for permitting a competent paralegal em-
ployee to conduct routine final settlements without a firm lawyer being
present.
Individual law firms can also increase their competitiveness in residen-
tial real estate transactions by increasing volume, as economies of scale nor-
mally accompany volume disposition of routine transactions. Advertising,
reduced fees, and quality service should produce the needed volume for
• . .(r) prohibit any member from entering into any open listing or exclusive agency listing;"
and all local and state defendants shall amend their rules and regulations to "[p]rovide that
the listing information disseminated by a Local MLS shall not disclose the total commission
payable on such listing." The Connecticut decrees have helped spawn at least two discount
brokerage firms in the state. One provides limited listing services for which it charges a flat fee
of $250. The other offers full service at a 3.5% commission, and in addition will pay 1% of the
purchase price to purchasers who buy through the firm. Sales agents are paid a modest salary
plus a commission below what most brokers pay. The firm has multiple listing service member-
ship and restricts itself to sales of residential properties.
167. On the cost-cutting potential of paralegals in law offices, see Q. JOHNSTONE & M.
WENGLINSKY, PARALEGALS: PROGRESS AND PROSPECTS OF A SATELLITE OCCUPATION 204-06
(1985).
168. For a somewhat more detailed statement of this position, see Paralegal Report:
Lawyers Professional Responsibility Obligations Concerning Paralegals, 59 CONN. BAR J.
425, 433-34 (1985).
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many firms willing to engage in this kind of specialty. Even with lowered
fees, the specialty should be profitable, given sufficient volume. In this, as
well as most other relatively standardized fields of law practice, aggressive
marketing and more efficient operations are going to be necessary for law-
yers to survive. A more radical proposal involving lawyers that might also
be worth implementing is conducting a full-scale residential real estate bro-
kerage business out of a law office, the entire enterprise owned and operated
by lawyers. Up to a point in many states, lawyers can legally act as real
estate brokers, but it is doubtful that they can fully merge law practice and
brokerage. Important efficiencies might be achieved by such a merger and
prospects would be increased that clients would receive needed legal advice
from the initial contract stage, something now often lacking. However, for
such an arrangement to be legally acceptable, serious conflict of interest,
solicitation, and tie-in problems would have to be resolved, problems more
readily dealt with if the merged operation did not seek to serve both buyer
and seller in the same transaction.
3. The problem of future viability of the thrifts is unresolved de-
spite the mix of deregulation and reregulation that has occurred over the
past decade. The next big move up in interest rates is likely to see most of
the thrifts again in serious trouble, as the degree and kind of thrift diversifi-
cation necessary to avoid ultimate disaster is not occurring extensively
enough. An appealing solution in this volatile period is to encourage still
further thrift diversity by removing most restraints on what thrifts can put
their money into and who can own thrifts, but at the same time continuing
to protect depositors through deposit insurance. The difficulty with this ap-
proach is working out an acceptable means of paying for the insurance pre-
miums. The present payment scheme is unsatisfactory, and enhancing thrift
diversity could increase the extent of high risk loan and investment activity
of many thrifts with consequent added risk of collapse and even greater
insurance claims. The advantage of the suggested approach, if the insur-
ance premium problem could be resolved, is that further thrift diversity
could greatly ease the thrifts' periodic profit squeeze from borrowing short
and lending long.
One way of dealing with the insurance premium issue would be to vary
premiums with the risk posed by the particular institution - the more risky
the enterprise, the higher the premiums. Differences of opinion exist as to
whether a fair system of risk-related deposit insurance premiums can be
imposed on either thrifts or commercial banks without overly-burdensome
regulation. 169 Calculating risk would be an onerous task requiring access to
169. For the position that a full-blown risk-related premium assessment program is not
currently feasible, see Isaac, supra note 89, at 207-08. A contrary view is expressed in Gray,
Deposit Insurance Reform: The Special Status of the Thrift Industry, 5 ANN. REV. OF BANK-
INC LAW 125, 130-31 (1986); Kane, The Role of Government in the Thrift Industry's Net-
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a great deal of data on each institution. As an alternative, more moderate
changes in the present government deposit insurance program have been
proposed. Among these proposals have been: providing expanded disclosure
to the public of information about depository institutions' financial condi-
tion, thereby imposing market discipline on these institutions through their
customers; restricting government insurance protection to smaller deposi-
tors; and encouraging private deposit insurance for larger depositors."'
More effort should be made to develop a workable and politically accept-
able risk-related deposit insurance program applicable to all depository in-
stitutions and one that is financially sound so that future congressional
bailouts will not be needed. This may be the key to long-term viability of
the thrifts. To the extent that thrifts are at risk from fraud and other illegal
conduct by their managements, an obvious solution is stepped-up govern-
ment regulatory enforcement action, including a sufficient staff of ade-
quately paid field examiners to make inspections often enough so that
chances of illegal conduct that could lead to institutional disaster are
largely eliminated. Lax enforcement contributed to the recent collapse of
speculatively oriented savings and loan associations in Texas and else-
where. ' Although federal agency enforcement programs have since been
strengthened, budgetary constraints and political pressures from the power-
ful financial services providers make maintaining a satisfactory enforcement
effort a matter requiring continued diligence."'
Ultimately, it is conceivable that the problem of the thrifts may largely
be eliminated by a still further expanding and broadening of the market for
securitized mortgages. This market may absorb most long-term mortgage
Worth Crisis, in FINANCIAL SERVICES, supra note 87, at 181-84. Problems involved in impos-
ing alternative risk-based deposit insurance premiums are discussed in R. LITAN, supra note
92, at 154-56.
170. Isaac, supra note 89, at 208-12. For arguments that greater reliance on depositor
imposition of market discipline is likely to prove counterproductive, see Garten, Banking on
the Market: Relying on Depositors to Control Bank Risks, 4 YALE J. ON REG. 129 (1986).
More recently, Mr. Isaac, former chairman of the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation
(FDIC), has recommended that by merging the financially sound FDIC, which insures mostly
commercial bank deposits, with the financially unsound Federal Savings and Loan Insurance
Corporation (FSLIC), the problem of failed and failing savings and loans would be solved. The
merged entity would generate about $23 billion over the next five years, enough to cover losses,
Isaac argues. Commercial banks could be assuaged by a series of concessions, including repeal
of the Glass-Steagall Act. Isaac, supra note 156. Mr. Isaac adds: "A merger of the FDIC and
FSLIC is inevitable. If industry and political leaders would exhibit some courage and imagina-
tion, the funds could be combined sooner rather than later." Id. The FDIC is opposed to
merger of the two funds and its chairman has taken the position that it is not an unlimited
resource capable of handling all the financial problems of the FSLIC. Seidman, FDIC &
FSLIC, Two Parts of One Industry?, MORTGAGE BANKING, Sept. 1987, at 31.
171. See, e.g., Apcar, supra note 148.
172. On the recent strengthening of the Federal Home Loan Bank Board's enforcement
efforts, see Gray, supra note 149, at 243-44.
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investment without extensive long-term holdings of mortgage interests by
the thrifts. Relative to real estate mortgages, the thrifts may more and
more resemble mortgage banks, originating but investing long-term far less
heavily. With many thrifts this trend is already apparent and in the future
may spread to most all thrifts. A wide range of other investors, attracted by
the diversity and other advantages of securitized mortgages, conceivably
may take over most of the thrifts' share of the long-term investment market
in real estate mortgages. Many other types of investors are better able to
assume the risks of long-term mortgage holdings than are the thrifts operat-
ing in their traditional manner of borrowing short and lending long with so
much of their assets in real estate mortgages. In addition to their mortgage
banking activities, the trend may also become more pronounced of thrifts
diversifying their activities so as to resemble increasingly commercial
banks. In effect, it is possible that the thrifts as we have known them may
largely disappear. The difficulty with this scenario is finding enough other
investors to absorb the bulk of the thrifts tremendous holdings of long-term
mortgage interests.
4. The inefficiencies in American land title record keeping sys-
tems are explainable but inexcusable. A number of suggestions have merit
for eventual improvement, with consequent benefit to land transfer consum-
ers and most of the others who must resort to these records. One relatively
simple suggestion is universally to set up tract indexes as the only public
indexes to documents recorded pursuant to the recording acts. Some coun-
ties already maintain tract indexes, important time-savers in title searching,
but this type of index should exist in all counties. Cost of system conversion
can be greatly reduced by making the change prospective only, thereby
making it unnecessary to re-index old records and gradually reducing the
need to rely on the old grantor-grantee indexes.
Another relatively simple proposal is to automate the public records in
all larger urban counties, at least prospectively, by computerizing indexes,
centralizing as many records as possible, and using low-cost photocopy
schemes for duplicating filed documents for examination. The Chicago Title
Insurance Company's Cook County, Illinois, plant is a model of what can
be done. Within a few years, it may even be financially feasible to store and
retrieve recorded documents by computer. Automation of public records not
only reduces costs and errors, but if properly organized could make private
title plants unnecessary, thereby eliminating one of the most inefficient fea-
tures of American land title protection, the duplication of public records for
some counties in separate private plants.
Inefficiencies in American public land title records are due largely to
the expense of making systemic changeovers and the frequent low-level of
local government competence in program administration. Local government
programs often are underfinanced, poorly managed, and staffed with per-
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sonnel poorly qualified and inadequately motivated. There are two sugges-
tions for possible long-term change that should be considered. One is for
public land title record keeping in larger urban counties to be contracted
out to the title companies that are experienced in creating and maintaining
private title plants, thereby in effect merging the public and private systems
in one privately operated public system. Even those large counties, for
which duplicate private plants do not exist, might find that this contracting-
out solution would provide better results for longer-term lower costs. Public
access to the public record system would be what it is now, with perhaps a
broader schedule of fees for access services.
The other suggestion for long-term consideration is that land title rec-
ord keeping be made a state rather than local government responsibility and
record-keeping be centralized statewide or in large regions within each
state. With modern data processing technology and the possibility of geo-
graphically scattered computer input and retrieval access, state assumption
of this function makes sense. The states tend to be more administratively
efficient than the localities. Some economies of scale in larger record keep-
ing operations would be possible and record keeping and data retrieval
would become standardized statewide, thus eliminating problems caused ti-
tle examiners from existing local variations.
A final reform proposal deserves mention at this point and it is Torrens
registration, a traditional favorite of academics, a system long-feared and
disparaged by the title companies."' This system of government approved
titles has much to be said for it. In fact, Torrens registration, or some regis-
tration variant of it, is the method of title protection followed in most coun-
tries, including most common law countries, although with minor exceptions
it has never caught hold in the United States.
At present in this country, there is little or no interest in expanding
Torrens or any other form of land title registration. As a movement it is
dormant. This may change, however. There are always the foreign exam-
ples of good, workable registration systems, and if concern of American
consumers over title protection costs escalates, the appeal of a potentially
cheaper system providing safer titles could ignite strong demand for substi-
tuting registration for the present recording act-private title insurance type
of protection now prevailing in the United States. The system would work
best if registration was mandatory and administration was at the state
rather than local government level.
5. The expansion, integration, and new entrant developments in
land title servicing considered in Section II, on balance, generally are desir-
173. On land title registration, see A. AXELROD, C. BERGER & Q. JOHNSTONE, LAND
TRANSFER AND FINANCE, CASES AND MATERIALS 881-911 (3d ed. 1986), and books and arti-
cles cited therein.
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able. They are increasing competition among land transfer servicers and
should help achieve lower operational costs. They pose, of course, a threat
to many established smaller firms unwilling or unable to sell out to the
giants and incapable of adapting to change by becoming more innovative
and efficient. If these firms lose out because they cannot compete, it is an
unfortunate but legitimate consequence of our free market system. A more
troubling aspect of the new developments is the extent to which they will
benefit consumers through lower prices or improved services. Although gen-
erally not directed at improving services, cost reduction and greater profits
are common objectives. However, it seems doubtful that consumers are
sharing sufficiently, if at all, in cost reduction benefits. Lack of market so-
phistication by most consumers of land transfer services contributes to the
problem. If it can be shown that the new developments are not producing
adequate consumer benefits, regulation or regulation enforcement should be
tightened as needed. To the extent that national or regional markets are
involved, and increasingly land transfer servicing markets are multistate,
renewed regulatory emphasis should be at the federal level. State by state
efforts to control widespread markets are cumbersome to apply and enforce
and tend to enhance market inefficiencies and inequities if meaningful re-
sults are attempted. Furthermore, meaningful results often are not intended
when responsibility for control over widespread markets is allocated to the
states. Advocacy of state responsibility for control often is a cover for advo-
cacy of no effective government control.
V. CONCLUSION
There are many important processes in which law is highly relevant.
Land transfer through purchase and sale is one of the most significant.
Others, illustrative of the variety of settings in which such processes can
develop, include medical malpractice claims, criminal law enforcement
against drug traffickers, estate planning and administration, and income
taxation. These processes are characterized by routine procedures or sys-
tems of action, and lawyers and other specialized groups are commonly in-
volved as service intermediaries in operating therein. Effectiveness of the
processes depends in large measure on how well these service specialists
function. To understand law in settings in which processes are important, it
is essential that the service specialists operating the processes be under-
stood, including what they do, their structure, their relations to one another
and to beneficiaries of their services, the controls they are subject to, and
any other considerations that are major influences on their role in process
implementation.
All of the important law-related processes exhibit deficiencies. Some of
these deficiencies are due to shortcomings of the service specialists operat-
ing the particular process. The service specialists are not responsible for
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other deficiencies yet these can have a tremendous impact on how well the
specialists function. Deficiencies in important law-related processes can be
difficult to remedy, as they normally are well-entrenched and favor power-
ful interest groups, and some are inherent in a particular process. Most
deficiencies are amenable to being eased or resolved by changes in law or
law enforcement, but formidable obstacles ordinarily stand in the way of
achieving such change. Needed change may come slowly or not at all.
Not only should more attention be given to understanding the special-
ized groups that administer law-related processes, but there also should be
more focus on process deficiencies, including deficiency identification and
resolution and the extent to which service specialists are responsible for pro-
cess weaknesses. Desirable change, both legal and nonlegal, can have a long
incubation period but must start with deficiency recognition and suggestions
for corrective action.
Among law-related processes, land transfers and their service special-
ists are particularly worthy subjects of study. The tremendous transaction
volume they handle and the impact that these transactions have on the
economy at large and on hundreds of thousands of buyers and sellers each
year make the process and those who operate it of major significance. This
significance is enhanced by recent developments that are changing how land
transfer servicers are structured and how they do business. The land trans-
fer process and its service specialists also exhibit serious deficiencies that
merit careful attention in hopes of relieving current problems now and
avoiding even more serious problems in the future. In addition, the deficien-
cies, the trend toward greater integration, and the occasional volatility of
the process and its servicers may suggest useful approaches to the study of
other law-related processes.
Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 22, No. 3 [1988], Art. 1
https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol22/iss3/1
